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Availability Payment Public Private Partnerships (PPPs) are long-term contracts where 
the private sector is allocated responsibilities of designing, building, financing, operating 
and maintaining the highway on a public project. In return to their services the private 
sector is reimbursed through a performance-based predetermined payment plan. As per 
this plan, the private sector is entitled to receive predetermined payments called 
Maximum Availability Payments (MAPs) throughout the concession term (operations 
and maintenance phase). Thus the MAP amount and the length of concession term would 
have a major influence on the overall project cost since any inappropriate increase or 
decrease to these terms will heavily influence the project outcomes. This mandates the 
public agencies to diligently design MAPs and concession term but review of practices 
shows that the public agencies have been relying on unwarranted traditional methods to 
finalize these terms. Furthermore, very few researchers have worked towards designing 
the concession term and all the previous works have considered the payments and 
concession term as independent variables. Last, the timing and cost of post-concession 
maintenance costs have never been considered before while designing payment structure 
and concession term.  
This research work introduces a hybrid model developed by blending the stochastic 
dynamic programming model with multi-objective linear optimization principles that 
would allow the public sector to determine the upper limit of availability payments and 
concession term. This model ensures that public sector’s cost saving objective and private 
sector’s financial stability objective are satisfied simultaneously. The model also 
integrates post-concession maintenance cost structures and thus enables this model to 
include the effects of post-concession maintenance costs into the design. This model also 
allows inclusion of the effects of variation in private sector’s financial condition and 
performance uncertainty in the design process. The research includes a case study 
focusing on Caltrans’ Presidio Parkway Project and covers analyses that provide valuable 
insights about the design of Availability Payment PPPs. The analysis also quantifies and 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
1.1 Introduction to PPPs 
Public Private Partnerships (PPPs or P3s) have earned a reputation of a promising project 
delivery method around the world and are used by public agencies for developing public 
infrastructure. PPPs enable the public sectors to share risks and rewards in non-traditional 
ways with the private sector fostering possibilities of better project outcomes. Countries 
such as the United Kingdom, Australia, Canada, Ireland, India, Portugal, Spain, Turkey, 
Japan and several other countries have used different types of PPPs successfully to 
develop assets including, but not limited to, highways, metro rails, airports, bridges, 
hospitals, schools, prisons and water treatment plants (FHWA, 2007; Kwak et al., 2009; 
Parker, 2011). The global success of PPPs and the funding deficits paved the way for 
PPPs in the United States during the early 90s. Since then, PPPs have been increasingly 
used to deliver public infrastructure in the United States and investment in PPPs 
increased by five times between 1998-2007 and 2008-10 (Angel et al., 2011).  In 
addition, the constantly increasing demand to add new roads and maintain aging 
infrastructure combined with the increasing financial deficits requires increased use of 
PPPs in the United States (Garvin, 2010; Mallett, 2008).   
A PPP is a long-term contract between public and private sectors for mutual benefits. In 
the United States, PPPs are considered for project delivery when a proposed project’s 
revenues streams are expected to be insufficient to meet all the financial obligations. For 
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such projects, PPPs enable the public sector to pursue the project by involving private 
sector for filling the funding gap. Apart from financing, private sector is also required to 
take (or share) several responsibilities from the public sector. Depending on the private 
sector’s investment, sharing of responsibilities and repayment method, the appropriate 
PPP type gets identified for the project. Commonly used PPPs in the United States 
include Design–Build (DB), Design–Build–Operate–Maintain (DBOM), Design–Build–
Finance–Operate–Maintain (DBFOM), Build–Own–Operate (BOO), Long-Term Leases 
and Availability Payment PPPs (Abdel, 2007; FHWA, 2007b; Mallett, 2008; Kwak et al., 
2009). Amongst these PPPs, the Availability Payment PPP is the newest type of PPP 
used in the United States.  
The Availability Payment PPP is generally a DBFOM PPP. In these PPPs, the private 
sector takes the responsibilities of designing, building, financing, operating and 
maintaining the highway and is reimbursed only after the highway is available for use. 
The operations and maintenance phase of the project is generally known as concession 
period and the private party is known as concessionaire. The reimbursements are linked 
to the private sector’s performance during the operations and the maintenance phase 
requiring the private sector to meet the performance standards as closely as possible. This 
motivates the private sector to construct the highway as soon as possible and then keep it 
available throughout the operations and maintenance phase, thus aligning public and 
private sector objectives.  However, the literature review indicates that the PPP designs 
(that include Availability Payment PPPs) can take various forms depending on project 
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requirements, and demands a more systematic approach to identify and evaluate the 
public interests in projects that use PPPs (GAO, 2008; Mallett, 2008). But, since the long-
term PPPs are relatively new to the United States, the public sector seems to have 
inadequate qualification for evaluating and designing efficient PPPs (Garvin, 2010; 
Buxbaum & Ortiz, 2007). This dissertation focuses on Availability Payment PPPs and 
provides a hybrid model that would help address several concerns faced by PPPs. 
1.2 Research Need  
Federal- and State-level highway funds in the United States are finding it difficult to meet 
funding obligations for maintaining aging infrastructure and developing new (Mallett, 
2008; Buxbaum & Ortiz, 2007; PEW, 2009; Silva & Lowy, 2011). In these harsh 
conditions, PPPs of various types have helped the public sector to deliver public projects. 
In particular, the use of Availability Payment PPP is believed to increase in the coming 
time (Parker, 2011). There are several inherent benefits of using Availability Payment 
PPPs, making them a preferred selection over other forms of PPPs. These benefits are: 
One of the biggest benefits of using Availability Payment PPPs is the ability to turn a toll 
revenue supported infeasible PPP to a feasible PPP (FHWA, 2007b; Parker, 2011).  
In case the PPPs (other than Availability Payments) are feasible, the private sector in 
today’s economy, would want to reduce its road use demand risk by having a non-
compete clause on the contract. This would prevent the public sector from making 
improvements to highways in the nearby region and might prove to be a disadvantage for 
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the public interests (as it was observed in the case of SR-91 in California) (Czerwinski & 
Geddes, 2010).  In the case of Availability Payment PPPs, since the private sector does 
not face road user demand risks, these clauses would not appear on the contract thus 
protecting public interests. 
The public sector begins paying the private sector when the highway becomes available 
and continues paying the predetermined performance-based availability payments 
throughout the operations and maintenance phases. This form of payment mechanism 
reduces the public sector’s responsibilities of arranging upfront capital finances, compels 
the private sector to meet all the performance standards to become eligible for earning 
availability payments without any deductions for substandard performance and helps the 
public sector cap the public sector expenses. 
Furthermore, since the private sector is paid directly by the public sector, highways with 
Availability Payments are usually free from tolling which in turn increases the 
acceptability of PPPs on sociopolitical accounts (Garvin et al., 2011).  
All these points suggest that considering the benefits of Availability Payment PPPs and 
the current financial condition, the use of Availability Payment PPPs (long-term 
performance-based concession PPPs, in general) would increase in the United States. 
Similar views are echoed by Buxbaum & Ortiz (2007) for long-term concession PPPs and 
the authors recommend using performance-based long-term concession PPPs (i.e., 
Availability Payment PPPs). The use of availability payments will enable achieving 
performance effectiveness as well as address public concerns regarding conflict of public 
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and private sector interests.  However, recent findings by FHWA shows that agencies are 
striving to align their higher-level goals with performance measures of the PPPs, but none 
of the agencies have achieved them completely (Garvin et al., 2011). The FHWA also 
points out that the performance measures are prone to change with the passage of time 
and the public sector must plan for such a dynamic nature of the project.   
In addition literature, the review also indicates that PPP designs (that includes 
Availability Payment PPPs) in the United States are influenced by the public sector’s 
requirements to receive upfront payments from the private sector rather than achieving 
operational efficiencies (Bel & Foote, 2009; Czerwinski & Geddes, 2010). Examples of 
the Chicago Skyway and the Indiana Toll Road are undisputed examples that prove the 
public sector’s history of using PPPs as a revenue generating mechanism. These have led 
to strong criticism and opposition towards the use of PPPs from several sections of 
society in the United States. In addition, PPPs where private sectors have filed 
bankruptcy (example: SR-125) or where private sectors have earned super profits 
(example: Chicago Skyway Project) or the private sector has gained excessive profits 
from a non-compete clause, (example: SR-91) all have contributed towards public burden 
through the use of PPPs. These projects have increased public skepticism over the public 
sector’s decision-making abilities for selecting and designing PPPs that can protect public 
interests. In 2008, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) conducted a study that 
evaluated the protection of public interests while using PPP projects. In its report, the 
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GAO recommended that transportation agencies develop and conduct rigorous upfront 
financial analyses to protect public interests.  
Addressing all these concerns, this dissertation focuses on design of availability payment 
mechanisms, enabling the public sector to achieve its performance requirements and 
making them safer to protect public interests. The predetermined annual payments that 
must be paid to the private sector for maintaining 100% availability of the highway, 
known as Maximum Availability Payment (MAPs), and the duration of the PPP contract, 
known as concession term, will be designed in this research work. This work 
distinguishes itself from the previous works since researchers have focused on design of 
concession or design of payment structure as separate problems.  Ng et al. (2007a) and 
Ng et al. (2007b) used the Monte Carlo Simulation model and fuzzy logic for optimal 
design of concession period of PPPs. Mostafa et al. (2010) used Fuzzy-Delphi technique 
for designing the concession period under uncertainty. Shen J and Wang S (2010) used 
Perti Nets (a graphical method) to design the concession length. Shen and Wu (2005) 
have focused on designing the concession length of Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) 
projects. Shen et al. (2007) and Nombela and Rus (2003) have similarly focused on 
negotiation of concession lengths and having flexibility of concession period 
respectively. Furthermore, none of the works have included the timing and amount of 
post-concession maintenance and rehabilitation costs into designs. This research work 
would also enable the public agencies to compare the project’s dynamic condition and 
would also enable them to find a solution to the problems.   
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As a result of this research the agencies would be able to design MAPs and concestion 
term simultaneously. Design of MAPs considering uncertainties in private sector’s 
performance would protect public interests and would provide public sector with a 
reliable estimate of its financing obligations. Design of concession term would cap the 
public costs, provide adequate time to the private sector to get returns on its investment 
and also merge the post-concession scheduled maintenance costs into analysis.   
1.3 Problem Definition 
The public sector pursues a highway development project for meeting objectives such as 
relieving congestion or developing highways to attract industries or to cope up with the 
increased development in a region or any other reason that benefits the public. Although 
the project can benefit the region, the local funding agencies in the United States often do 
not have adequate funds for the project. In such conditions, PPPs are considered for the 
project delivery. The proposed PPPs can be supported through its estimated toll revenues 
if the estimated traffic is high; however, if the estimated revenue streams are weak, the 
Availability Payment PPPs are considered for the project delivery.  
For Availability Payment PPPs in the United States, the competitive bidding approach is 
used to identify the private party, offering the best value or the lowest cost (Kessler, 
2011). Generally, in practice, the best value approach is seen more often. For example, in 
the case of the Florida Department of Transportation’s (FDOT) Port of Miami Tunnel 
and Access Improvement Project, the selection of the private sector was done using the 
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best value approach. As a part of procurement process, FDOT disclosed its established 
limit of MAPs (which was actually the upper limit of MAPs) and also fixed the 
concession tenor (FDOT, 2006). The private sector was invited to bid on the project. The 
received bids were evaluated and the bidder Miami Access Tunnel (MAT) was found to 
offer the best value for the project.   MAT was declared as the private party on the project 
and was allocated the responsibilities of designing, building, financing, operating and 
maintaining the project for 35-years. Such a contract where the majority of the 
responsibilities (generally long-term responsibilities) are given to a private sector is 
known as a concession and the private party that wins such a contract is known as a 
concessionaire. Being the concessionaire, MAT is required to design, construct, finance 
as well as maintain and operate the tunnel. Timely construction of the tunnel would 
enable the project to enter the operations and maintenance phase, marking the start of 
predetermined reimbursements known as Maximum Availability Payments (MAPs). To 
get 100% reimbursements, it would be necessary for MAT to operate and maintain the 
tunnel and achieve 100% availability of the tunnel. If MAT fails to achieve 100% 
availability, the MAPs would be reduced as per the penalties defined in the contract 
documents.  A very similar approach was also used for the Presidio Parkway Project in 
California (Caltrans, 2010). These bidding practices (especially disclosing the MAP 
limits and fixing the concession term upfront) will continue since it is believed that 
limiting the MAPs and concession term would enable the public sector to compare and 
evaluate the bids. 
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It must be noted here that when the public sector discloses its capacity to pay MAPs and 
the concession term, they are not in a position to ascertain which private party will win 
the concession, what will be its construction efficiency, how the actual financial structure 
of the PPP will look like, and how efficient the private party will be during operation and 
maintenance phase of the highway. Hence, the public sector is forced to ignore these 
aspects and with the motive of getting the project delivered, proceeds with the bidding 
process. This process helps the public sector during procurement but leaves it vulnerable 
to several risks. 
The limits on MAPs and concessions are determined considering the public sector’s long-
term societal objectives and funds available for the project. In addition, these decisions 
are made at a time when the public sector has no information about the private sector. 
Under these conditions the public sector can face the following risks: 
1. The MAP limit offered by the public sector might be too high allowing the private 
sector to earn super profits. 
2. Some private parties may submit very aggressive bids to win the competitive 
bidding. This could expose the project, the end-users and the public sector 
towards risks of major refinancing during the concession.     
3. Every additional year of concession would allow the private sector to retain 




4. If the concession term is shorter, the risk of private sector’s failure due to not 
being able to get reasonable returns on its investment increases.  
5. In addition, if the concession duration is shorter, the post concession highway 
maintenance costs would fall back on the public sector, which might not be 
beneficial for the end-users and the public sector.   
In either case, it is a loss to the public. This could mean that the public sector might end 
up paying much more than it is required. This could lead to higher dissatisfaction 
amongst the people paying tolls and further increase in opposition towards PPPs. Hence, 
there is a need to develop a model that will enable public sector to: 
1. Design MAPs allowing reduction in public sector’s long-term expenses, 
2. Design MAPs that can keep the private sector (still unidentified) motivated to stay 
in the PPPs even after facing uncertainties during the concession, 
3. Design a concession term that enables the public sector to meet its long-term 
objectives (including post concession objectives) and 
4. Design a concession term that would enable the private sector to earn reasonable 
returns from the project.  
Achieving all the above objectives will not only ensure that the public sector objectives 
are met but will also ensure that the private sector earns at a reasonable rate of return. As 
a result, the public sector would be able to identify MAPs having smaller values. These 




1.4 Research Methodology 
The issues discussed in the previous section justify a dedicated research towards design 
of the Availability Payment mechanism. The research process was divided into five 
major categories (see Figure 1) and these categories are briefly explained in the following 










The review of Availability Payment PPP projects in the United States led to the 
identification of the problems associated with these PPPs (as pointed out in Sections 1.2 
Literature Review 
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Figure 1 Research Flow Chart 
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and 1.3). This demanded identifying and understanding the root causes of these problems. 
Hence, an extensive literature review was conducted covering several areas. 
Literature Review 
The outcomes of Availability Payment PPPs, like all other types of PPPs, were found to 
be influenced by several project characteristics. Hence, the literature review was 
specifically focused to study effects and impacts of project finances; identification and 
evaluation of risks; and characteristics of Availability Payment PPPs. Review of all these 
topics helped in gaining a deeper understanding of the problems associated with 
Availability Payment PPPs. In addition to this, the literature review was also extended to 
learn about the mathematical models and concepts that were used during analysis and 
conclusion of this research work. 
Model Development 
The issues pointed out in Sections 1.2 and 1.3 required development of a model that 
could work as a prototype of the actual Availability Payment PPPs. This required that the 
model could: 
1. represent long-term projects,  
2. address all the uncertainties associated with the private sector,  
3. include timing and costs of post-concession maintenance activities, and 
4. simultaneously satisfy private and public sectors’ competing objectives.  
13 
 
Hence, a model was developed by blending multi-objective linear programming 
principles with a stochastic dynamic programming model. The model was developed to 
fit the stochastic dynamic programming model that conveniently enabled the model to 
capture effects of variations due to uncertainty in decision-making.    
Case Study and Validation   
The California Department of Transportation’s (Caltrans) Presidio Parkway Project was 
selected as a case study for this research work since majority of the information required 
in the model was readily available on the Internet. Although some of the details were not 
exactly as they were required as inputs to the model, the details were enough to be 
combined to develop all the information that was needed. In addition, since all the 
information from the private sector was not available, a few assumptions were made 
during this case study. The results were validated by developing the model as close as 
possible to the final agreement and then comparing the results.  
Conclusions 
Results were obtained by running several models, each representing a certain project 
factor, which helped in reaching at several valuable conclusions. 
1.5 Contribution 
This research work introduces a method to design MAPs and concession term 
simultaneously. A hybrid model, formed by blending multi-objective programming 
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principles with the stochastic dynamic programming model, is used in this research that 
will help design MAPs and concession term simultaneously by including the private 
sector’s performance uncertainties in analysis. This work, for the first time, combines 
planning, construction, operations and maintenance and post-concession project costs in a 
single model for designing Availability Payment PPPs and thus sets up a stage for design 
of concession term based on the design life cycle of a highway. 
This research also identifies and quantifies the factors affecting the design. The factors 
analyzed are private sector’s performance, private sector’s risk aptitude, private sector’s 
construction efficiency and improvement in private sector’s O&M efficiency. Three 
amongst these four factors are related to private sector’s performance and hence this 
research work can be used to design performance-based Availability Payment PPPs 
rather than just designing finance based Availability Payment PPPs. Thus, this research 
work can help the public sectors to achieve the long-term performance-based objectives.  
1.6 Organization of Dissertation 
This research work is devoted to address all the issues discussed in Sections 1.2 and 1.3. 
This research work presents a multi-objective stochastic dynamic programming model 
that will enable the public sector to design a PPP’s Availability Payment parameters.  Use 
of this model will improve the overall efficiency of PPP projects. This dissertation 
presents a method to design Availability Payment mechanisms in a very structured way. 
Chapter 2 covers the literature review of PPP projects and Chapter 3 introduces the multi-
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objective stochastic dynamic programming model. Chapter 4 demonstrates the 
application of the model on the Presidio Parkway Project and designs the Availability 
Payments. Chapter 5 demonstrates the use of the model to design concession period and 
Chapter 6 includes analysis for identification of factors affecting Availability Payment 
parameters. Chapter 7 is the final chapter that summarizes and concludes this research 
work.    
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Chapter 2 Review of Literature and Modeling Methodology 
Availability Payment PPPs are dependent on factors such as project finances, deductions 
that reduce MAPs and the characteristics of Availability Payment PPPs. This chapter 
presents research work done in these areas that will enable establishing the existing gap 
in the body of knowledge. In addition to this, this chapter also introduces the 
mathematical methods used during this research work.  
2.1 History of PPPs 
PPPs have emerged as an indispensable tool for meeting infrastructure demands around 
the world. Countries like the United Kingdom, Australia and Canada have used PPPs 
extensively for developing infrastructure. In the United States, PPP programs are 
relatively new (FHWA, 2007). As per the “Report to Congress On Public Private 
Partnerships,” the first turnpike was developed between Philadelphia and Lancaster in 
Pennsylvania in 1792. Between 1945 and 1955, several turnpikes were developed in the 
northern and eastern parts of the United States. These turnpikes were managed by public 
turnpike commissions or turnpike authorities that led to establish a belief in the people 
that providing highways was the responsibility of public agencies and the majority of 
them never thought of involving the private sector in developing highways. However, the 
public sector realized the increasing acceptance of peoples’ willingness to pay tolls and 
have access to highways. The increase in demand of infrastructure and the drying up of 
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funds from gas taxes led the State agencies to explore the potentials of involving the 
private sector in highway construction programs.  
This led to the FHWA passing the Special Experimental Project 14 (SEP-14) that allowed 
the States to evaluate Innovative Contracting (which was later changed to Alternative 
Contracting in 2002) proposals, which would enable the public sector to transfer risks to 
the private sector (FHWA, 2009) in 1990. This was followed by passing of the 
Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act (ISTEA) just one year later, which 
enabled the use of tolls to greater extents, the private entities to own public facilities and 
the States to loan project costs to private entities (FHWA, 2004). 
Since then, PPPs of various types have been employed for developing several highways 
in the United States. Literature review shows that over the past few years the use of PPPs 
has increased significantly. A survey conducted in 2008 reveals that 42% of the States 
planned to implement PPPs in the near future, 21% are currently practicing and 21% can 
be considered as experienced in PPPs (Cui & Lindly, 2010). The advantages that PPPs 
offer (Kwak et al., 2010; USDOT 2007) and the depletion of State and Federal funds 
(CBO, 2008) that used to fund highway development projects as well as the international 
success of PPPs indicates that use of PPPs will be necessary for the United States to keep 
up with the pace of increasing demand of new highways (FHWA, 2007).  
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2.2 Project Finances 
Highway projects are financed through debts and if necessary the equity investment is 
allowed on the project. The process of arranging funds available through debts is called 
debt financing and the process of arranging equity on projects is called equity financing 
(Refer to Appendix 1 for additional details on the Debt and Equity Financing 
mechanism). When the project requires private equity investment but reimbursement 
through tolls cannot guarantee an adequate rate of return, the project is procured as an 
Availability Payment PPP. It must be noted here that the Availability Payment PPPs are 
pursued on the basis of a project’s financial structure during procurement; hence, it is 
necessary to review the research work done towards financial structuring of PPPs. In 
addition to this, the concessionaire is paid availability payments throughout the 
concession period during which the concessionaire faces dynamic and uncertain 
conditions. These characteristics of Availability Payment PPP are used to develop a 
mathematical model in this research. Hence, a literature review was conducted to study 
the research done addressing issues related to project finances (especially equity cash 
flow) as well as structuring PPP finances. 
The PPP financial structure is largely based on estimates of road-user demand, estimates 
of overall growth of the region, estimates of revenue generation and estimates of costs. 
Since the financial structure is dependent on all these estimates, a strong analysis is 
required to design it properly and ensure that public interests are protected. In 2008, the 
Government Accountability Office (GAO) conducted a study to evaluate PPP projects in 
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terms of protecting public interests. The GAO pointed out that since the public sector in 
essence gives up control over a future stream of toll revenues in exchange for up-front 
payment concession, PPPs might not be warranted considering the uncertainties of traffic 
on these toll roads. It may happen that the net present worth of the exchanged future 
stream of toll revenues will become much larger than the up-front concession received. 
GAO recommended that transportation agencies develop and conduct up-front financial 
analyses to determine the benefits and costs of PPP agreements and to better deliver 
transportation infrastructure projects. Furthermore, NCHRP Synthesis 364 documents 
that only seven projects registered actual revenue streams within 10% of expected 
revenues (Kriger et al 2007). When the actual revenues are less than expected, the 
contractor may abandon the project or may declare bankruptcy. On the other hand, if the 
revenue streams are higher than expected, using PPP for project delivery can be 
questioned. In either situation the end users lose faith in the public sector’s decision-
making ability and in PPPs. The Indiana Toll Road and the Chicago Skyway projects are 
good examples of where the financial design of the PPP has let the government lose huge 
revenue streams (Cui & Lindly, 2010 and GAO, 2008). 
Researchers have put forward accounts of various research works that can improve the 
setting up of financial structure for a PPP project. Vassalo (2010) evaluated the effect of 
government’s use of established discount rate on the traffic risk profile. The author 
modifies the net present value equation, making several assumptions and after analysis 
recommends that the discount rate should never be more than the Weighted Average Cost 
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of Capital (WACC). Lui and Cheah (2009) used real options for modeling the PPP 
structure for a wastewater treatment plant in China. The wastewater treatment plant’s 
equity structure and shareholding system was redesigned to attract private investors to be 
involved in state-owned assets. Using real options methodology, a negotiation band was 
identified between the higher tariff rates and lower tariff levels. The area between these 
bands enclosed a range for mutually acceptable tariff rate between parties. The use of real 
options methodology helped to realize a larger feasible bargaining range between parties, 
which would prevent parties from getting into a negotiation breakdown stage. Power et 
al. (2009) also used Real Options to investigate feasibility and economic value of an 
option for the government to buy back the leased infrastructure at a future date prior to 
lease expiration. The authors used buyout options and revenue-sharing options in their 
study. The first option was modeled as the Bermudan call option and the second option 
was modeled as a sequence of European call options. The research shows that the 
inclusion of buyout or revenue sharing option will prove to be costlier for PPPs. Zhang 
(2005c) has used the optimization model to facilitate private and public sectors to 
conduct financial viability analysis and collectively determine an optimal capital 
structure. Zhang (2006) has put forward the use of a best value source selection (BVSS) 
methodology by using a set of best value contributing factors (BVCFs) for selecting the 
right private sector partner. The BVSS methodology allows for achieving maximum 
outcome from a business transaction. Using the BVSS methodology requires that the 
tenders be evaluated using multi-criterion evaluation methodology and the BVCFs are 
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project specific so the BVCFs need to be tailored to reflect the public client’s business 
needs. 
Several researchers focused on guarantees offered by the public sector. Guarantees are 
used by governments to help private investors to recover from losses if the expected 
revenue falls below the expected levels. These guarantees must be designed with due 
diligence ensuring that the guarantees are high enough to make the project economically 
feasible and at the same time keep the guarantee levels low enough to not to burden the 
government and society in excess. A well-defined guarantee helps to attract private 
investors to invest in high-risk infrastructure projects. The results indicate that use of 
option-pricing methods can enable government to assess levels of guarantees, their 
impact on risk of the project and the expected value of the government outlays 
effectively.  Brandao and Saraiva (2008) used a minimum traffic guarantee (MTG) real 
option model, which models a PPP with guarantees and helps  put a cap on the total 
government outlays. On the other hand, Ashuri et al. (2010) used a Real Options 
methodology to design a Minimum Revenue Guarantee and a Toll Revenue Cap for PPP 
projects. The authors used a binomial lattice model of Real Options in this research. The 
authors included a case study of a highway between Incheon International Highway and 
Seoul and demonstrated the use of the proposed method. 
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2.3 Deductions in Availability Payment PPPs 
Deductions are applied to the MAPs for non-availability of highway lanes (i.e., non-
compliance with contractual conditions). These deductions can take any value ranging 
from zero and full MAP (Saage & Ajise, 2011). The amount of deduction depends on 
predetermined contractual conditions. The contractual conditions generally establish a 
rate of deduction for events that can contribute towards non-availability of highway 
lanes. The longer it takes to address the events leading to non-availability, the higher is 
the deduction. Hence, the concessionaire’s operational and maintenance efficiency can 
have a direct effect on the deductions. So, a literature review was carried out to identify 
factors leading to obstruction of traffic on highways, and the time that might be required 
to address the issues obstructing the traffic, thus estimating deductions for the 
Availability Payment PPPs.  
The literature review shows that factors that can contribute towards non-availability of 
the highway lanes are (Shin et al., 2002 and Shrank et al., 2010): 
a. Crashes and Breakdowns 
b. Weather 
c. Regular and Periodic Maintenance (work zones) 
Crashes and breakdowns affect the availability of highways. The availability of highway 
lanes depends on the severity of crashes. When the crash is very severe, more than one 
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lane can be affected, which may result in the closure of multiple lanes. On the other hand, 
if the crash in non-fatal, the lanes may be unavailable for a relatively shorter period of 
time. The literature review shows that the lane closure information occurring due to 
crashes has not been documented directly, but the effect has been documented in terms of 
congestion and delay (Shin et al., 2002 and Shrank et al., 2010). The report documents 
that crashes caused 9 hours of average delay per driver in 1999. This report also stated 
that the information about breakdowns is scarce and estimates an average delay of 2.4 
hours per driver.  
Weather may create unfavorable conditions for smooth highway operations. Conditions 
like rain, snow, fog and ice may make the highway unusable for an unprecedented time. 
This affects availability of highway lanes and thus the deductions. 
Periodic and regular maintenance is the last major factor that affects highway lane 
availability. Regular and periodic maintenance requires planning from the operating 
agencies (except for the maintenance jobs that require immediate response). Hence, the 
lane closures are documented by agencies and several researchers have studied the work 
zones for various works in several states (NCHRP Report 500 and Lindly & Clark, 2004). 
The information provided in these works can be used directly for calculating deductions 
for periodic maintenance. However, the regular maintenance activities are less time 
consuming and are much cheaper than periodic maintenance. Hence, the time and cost 
associated with regular maintenance is not considered when dealing with life cycle cost 
analyses (FHWA, 1998). 
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Each of the factors discussed above is uncertain and affects the availability of highways. 
If available, each of these causes must be included in the calculations of highway lane 
unavailability deductions. However, the detailed information on lane closure data (or 
estimates) is not available for each of these factors. Collecting or estimating this data will 
require dedicated efforts to collect, analyze and interpret data to estimate lane closures. 
In addition to these factors, the private sector’s operational and maintenance efficiency 
also plays a major role in the estimation of deductions. If the private sector is very 
efficient, the duration to address the events leading to deductions will be much less; 
however, if the private sector is not able (due to lack of resources or due to lack of 
experience) to address such events in time, the deductions can exceed up to the MAP for 
the term and also lead to termination of the concession.  
The factors discussed above lead to deductions in Availability Payment PPPs. Combining 
all the effects from all these factors can provide valuable information about the 
deductions expected to be faced by the private sector. However, since the methods and 
data that could enable estimating deductions are not yet available, there exists a need for 
dedicated research to develop methods and/or processing data to estimate deduction.  
2.4 Payment Mechanisms 
The literature review of PPP projects shows that design of concession period has not yet 
grabbed much attention of researchers. The literature review shows that there are very 
few research articles addressing the issue of design of concession. Gross and Garvin 
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(2009) in their work have emphasized the need of structuring concession lengths and toll 
rates together. They have analyzed several PPP projects and concluded that by using the 
two variables together would allow both partners to perform better in terms of their risks 
and rewards. Ng et al. (2007) used the Monte Carlo Simulation model for optimal design 
of concession period of PPPs. In their model, the researchers used cost of designing, 
construction, operation, management and maintenance of facility, revenues and annual 
income as uncertain parameters. The model was developed to ensure that the private 
sector received reasonable returns rather than excessive returns and the public sector 
could reclaim the ownership of the facility at an appropriate time. The authors used 
normal and uniform distributions for the uncertain parameters and also used a 
hypothetical case study to demonstrate the use of the model. The authors also developed 
another model that used simulation and fuzzy logic to design concession in PPPs using 
the same hypothetical model (Ng et al. 2007 b). In this work, the authors developed the 
model for minimum expected investment and tariff regime.   
On the other hand, Mostafa et al. (2010) used the Fuzzy-Delphi technique for designing 
the concession period under uncertainty. This method involved obtaining opinions of 
experts regarding the values of different parameters affecting the net present value of the 
project. After combining these opinions, fuzzy logic was used to design the concession 
period. In a similar way, Shen, J. and Wang, S. (2010) used Perti nets (a graphical 
method) to design the concession length. The authors modeled the problem to ensure that 
the investors got return on their investments and also ensure that the public sector got 
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reasonable income. Shen et al. (2007) proposed use of the bargaining-game theory for 
negotiating concession lengths. The paper describes bargaining-game as the game where 
the players have common interest to cooperate but have conflicting interests over how to 
cooperate. The authors applied the model to the Dong-Fan Bridge and estimated the 
concession length to be between the range of 18.35 and 18.65 years.  The game theory 
approach was also used by Ho (2006) to show when and how a government can rescue a 
distressed project and what impacts its rescue behavior had on project procurement and 
management.  
Shen and Wu (2005) have researched to design the concession length of Build-Operate-
Transfer (BOT) projects. The authors varied the net present value of cash flows to design 
concession lengths. The authors assumed normal distribution to simulate the uncertainty 
in NPV. Apart from this, the authors also used annual capital investment, annual traffic 
volume, toll price, construction time, annual maintenance costs and annual discount rate 
in the model. Nombela and Rus (2003) proposed the use of flexible terms in PPP projects 
and showed that having a fixed concession period does not yield optimal outcomes. The 
authors recommended using flexible concession periods for PPP projects. 
2.5 Decision Support Tools 
Several decision support tools and models have been developed by various agencies 
worldwide that help in decision-making. These tool and models focus on different aspects 
of PPPs (including Availability Payment PPPs) and enable the public sector to improve 
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the outcomes. This section provides information about several such tools and models 
used around the world. 
The World Bank developed a PPP toolkit named Toolkit for Public Private Partnerships 
in Roads and Highways (PPIAF, 2009). It consists of six modules that address choosing 
the right PPP, tailoring PPPs to fit its environment, protection of public interests, legal 
and regulatory issues, implementing and monitoring PPPs at project level. The United 
Kingdom uses an HM Treasury’s spreadsheet model for conducting Value for Money 
assessment. India has developed its own online PPP Toolkit that can be used by the PPP 
community to make decisions needed to plan, develop and carry out successful PPPs 
(Government of India, 2010).  
The Texas Department of Transportation (TxDOT) has developed an MS Excel based 
Public-Private Partnership (PPP) feasibility toolkit model named as TxDOT Public-
Private Feasibility Analysis Model. Texas DOT has also developed a second MS Excel 
based toolkit called a Toll Viability Screening Tool that is used to determine the viability 
of toll roads during the preliminary stages (TTI, 2004). Alabama DOT recently started 
using an MS Excel based Toolkit called P3FAST (PPP Feasibility Analysis Toolkit) that 
enables conducting feasibility analysis and optimally design financial structure of the 
project (Cui et al., 2010).  
Apart from these toolkits and models, several other works can be referenced here that can 
be used to improve PPP outcomes. Zhang (2005b) identified several criteria for selecting 
a right private-sector partner and differentiated them into four different packages. Sharma 
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et al. (2010) developed a Linear Programming model to optimally structure PPP finances. 
Asmar et al. (2009) in their work provided a methodology that can be used to select the 
best alliance team for Design Build/Alliance project delivery systems for PPPs. In their 
work, the authors used the Monte Carlo simulation to consider uncertainty in variables.   
Zhang (2009) used fuzzy logic considering the best value approach to select the best 
concessionaire. The best value approach is defined “as a set of systematic government 
procedures for the acquisition of public works and services, with an aim to achieve the 
best value (i.e., the maximum possible outcome) from such acquisition (NCPPP, 2002).  
In this work, the author tries to achieve two goals: 1) establishment of a set of cost- and 
non-cost evaluation criteria that can effectively measure the concessionaire’s capability 
and predict its future performance toward achieving the government’s best value 
objectives (BVOs) and 2) the development of a sound selection method ensuring a 
balanced tradeoff between these two criteria. In this work, the author achieves the first 
objective by defining a four-package evaluation criteria that includes: 1) financial 
(includes 35 elements), 2) technical (includes 26 elements), 3) safety, health and 
environmental (includes 15 elements), and 4) managerial (includes 16 elements).  
Zhang (2009) also established a systematic approach to establish appropriate criteria for 
concessionaire selection that can be summarized as: 1) a study of the worldwide practices 
in concessionaire selection in terms of bidding processes, evaluation criteria, and 
selection methods; 2) a review of the very limited literature on concessionaire selection; 
3) interviews and correspondences with international PPP researchers and practitioners; 
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and 4) further analysis, distillation, systematic coding and grouping of the evaluation 
criteria through a knowledge mining process of the information obtained in stages 1-3.  
The second objective was achieved by developing a fuzzy model. This method required 
scoring of evaluation packages by experts, which help in determining the weights for 
analysis. The author also used a 0 to 5 scale to determine the rate of significance of each 
criterion within each package.  Although it is felt that this approach can be used to select 
the best project delivery, the method appears to be time consuming, costly and requires 
participation from experts of various fields. Furthermore, the method includes uses 
scoring by experts, which will include subjectivity in the analysis. Zhang et al. (2007) 
also presented a method to select concessionaire. In this analysis, the authors used the 
Kepner-Tregoe decision analysis technique. 
McCowan and Mohamed (2007) developed a Decision Support System (DSS) that can be 
used to evaluate and compare different PPP projects. This paper provides mathematical 
background that can combine all the financial and non-financial factors together, which 
can be used to make decisions.  The authors used the method to identify the best project 
from three identified projects. 
2.6 Review of Mathematical Methods 
Since the Availability Payment PPPs are long-term projects, face uncertainties and have 
competing and conflicting objectives, the stochastic dynamic programming model and 
multi-objective linear programming models were used in this research work. These 
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models were blended to develop a hybrid model to model Availability Payment PPPs and 
hence a review of these methods is included here. These methods will be discussed in 
detail in Chapter 3.  
2.6.1 Stochastic Dynamic Programming 
Stochastic Dynamic Programming (SDP) models are used to obtain solutions to several 
optimization problems. The stochastic dynamic programming model has been used since 
the PPPs during the operation and maintenance phase satisfy Bellman’s Principle of 
Optimality - “An optimal policy has the property that whatever the initial state and the 
initial decisions are, the remaining decisions must constitute an optimal policy with 
regard to the state resulting from the first decision”(Benli 1999).  
While using the SDPs, the problems are broken down into several stages, which makes 
them a good modeling method to represent long-term Availability Payment PPPs. SDPs 
in general should have the following properties (Winston, 2004): 
1. The SDP problem can be divided into stages with a decision required at each 
stage. 
2.  Each stage has a number of states associated with it. 
3. The decision chosen at any stage describes how the state at the current stage is 
transformed into the state at the next stage. 
4. Given the current state, the optimal decision for each of the remaining stages must 
not depend on previously reached states or previously chosen decisions. 
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5. If the states for the problem have been classified into one of T stages, there must 
be a recursion that relates the cost or reward earned during stages t, t + 1, …. , T 
to the cost or reward earned from stages t + 1, t + 2, … , T. In essence, the 
recursion formalizes the working-backward procedure. Mathematically a 
recursion formula for SDPs can take be expressed as 
  	. 					|, 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|, 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           (2.1) 
  Where, 
ft(i) = minimum costs during stages t, t + 1, … end of the problem 
given that the state at the beginning of stage t is i. 
p(j|i,a,t) = probability that the next period’s state will be j, given 
that the current (stage t) state is i and action a is chosen. 
 The use of SDPs brought its own share of advantages and disadvantages to this research. 
The biggest advantage of employing SDPs in this research was from its similarity and 
simplicity in solving linear and non-linear optimization problems. However, solving 
SDPs may increase the computational burden significantly and may make it difficult (in 
some cases) to obtain a solution in a reasonable time frame.  
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SDPs have been used in various fields where decisions at different stages could make a 
difference toward the success of processes. Eckhause et al (2009) used a SDP to enable 
public sector acquisition managers to determine optimal vendor selection strategies. 
Tereso et al., (2003) used SDPs to allocate resources under stochastic conditions for 
multi-modal activity networks. Gabriel et al., (2004) used SDPs to determine optimal 
power load estimates for electric power retailers. Chiara et al., (2007) developed a multi-
least squares Monte Carlo method using real options and dynamic programming frameset 
to support a highly flexible contract that would enable dealing with revenue risks for 
Build-Operate-Transfer PPP.    
2.6.2 Multi-objective Linear Programming 
 Construction projects require participation of various parties and generally it is observed 
that the parties compete with each other for gaining and increasing their benefits. 
Unfortunately, a similar situation is observed in all types of PPP projects. The public 
sector wants to reduce its expenses towards the projects and the private sector wants to 
increase its earnings. If decisions are made just to satisfy the public sector’s expense 
reduction objective, the project might lose its potential to attract the private sector to bid 
and continue on a long-term PPP project. On the other hand, if the private sector is able 
to gain very high profits, the use of PPPs might not get public approval in the future.  
A multi-objective linear programming can be defined as (Gabriel, 2006a; Sahakij, 2008) 
Minimize {f1(x), f2(x), f3(x)…. fk(x)} 
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Subject to         (2.1) 
x ∈ S ⊆ N 
where, 
f1(x), f2(x) . . . , fk(x) are linear objectives functions to be 
minimized  
S is the feasible region defined by linear functions  
N represents real numbers. 
The multi-objective linear programming model can be solved by two different ways: 1) 
Constraint Method and 2) Weighting Method.  
1) The Constraint Method 
Solving the optimization problem 2.1 using the constraint method would require that the 
objective function be turned to a single-objective optimization problem and all the 
remaining objectives be treated as constraints. This would transform 2.1 to a new form as 
shown below (Sahakij, 2008): 
Minimize fh(x) 
subject to        (2.2) 
x ∈ S 
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fp(x) ≤ Up,  p = 1, 2, . . . , h − 1, h + 1, . . . , k 
In the above formulation, the objective function fh(x) can be arbitrarily selected from the 
list of objectives that must be minimized. The remaining objectives take the form of 
linear constraints represented by fp(x) ≤ Up. 
 2) The Weighted Method 
Use of the weighted method would require that the objectives in the objective function of 
formulation 2.1 be multiplied by weights as shown below (Gabriel, 2006a; Sahakij, 
2008):   
Minimize ∑ %&&'&(  
subject to        (2.3) 
x ∈ S 
   ∑ %&  1'&(  
wi ≥ 0;  i = 1, 2, . . . , k 
The optimization problem 2.3 is linear and can be easily solved using existing methods 
and tools. In must be noted here that if one objective is assigned high-valued weight, the 
solution 2.3 would give more importance to the objective having higher weight. 
Furthermore, the weights largely depend on the utility function of the decision-makers 
and the decision-makers must select weights with caution when using MOLP.   
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 Since the MOLP allows inclusion of several objectives in a single optimization problem, 
it is difficult (rather, it is impossible) to get “a solution” that would satisfy all the 
stakeholders. In such cases, an improvement in one of the objectives comes at an expense 
of at least one of the other objectives (Gabriel, 2006b; Cohon, 1978). Such a condition 
can be expressed by using the concept of Pareto Optimality, which can be expressed 
mathematically as shown below (Edgeworth, 1881; Pareto, 1896; adopted from Gabriel, 
2008): 
“A decision vector x* ϵ S is Pareto optimal if there does not exist another vector x ϵ S 
such that zi(x) ≤  zi(x*) for all i = 1,2,…., k and zj(x) < zj(x*) for at least one index j”.  
The above definition can be explained used the following figure: 
 
Figure 2 Illustration for Pareto Optimal Set 
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Figure 2 represents a Pareto Optimal set where both the objective functions are to be 
minimized. Hence, the points lying towards the south-west direction would be a part of 
the Pareto Optimal surface. In the above figure, points A, B, C, D and E fall towards the 
south-west direction of the feasible region and hence represent the Pareto Optimal curve. 
The points p, q, r and s are inferior to the points A, B, C, D and E and hence do not fall 
on the Pareto Optimal Curve.  The decision-makers must select an appropriate point on 
the Pareto Optimal Curve that would represent their utility in the best possible way.   
Multi-objective Linear Programming (MOLP) has been used in situations where 
stakeholders have competing objectives. Researchers have used multi-objective 
programming to satisfy several objectives in several fields. Gabriel et al., (2007) used a 
multi-objective optimization model to minimize the odor of the bio-solids while at the 
same time trying to minimize the treatment and distribution costs. Gabriel et al., (2006a) 
used a multi-objective optimization model to prioritize selection of projects in a portfolio. 
The authors considered project value, managerial labor (input) needed, and average costs 
as objectives. In another work Gabriel et al., (2006b) used a multi-objective optimization 
model to minimize overall cost of portfolio of projects while maximizing the total value 
from the projects. Nair and Miller-Hooks (2009) used multi-objective programming 
model to maximize coverage of the emergency medical service fleet while minimizing its 




Chapter 3 Model for Availability Payment Design 
Previous chapters provide details about the current practice adopted by public sectors 
when using Availability Payment PPPs. Extensive literature review shows that although 
the use of long-term PPPs, including Availability Payment PPPs, is expected to increase 
in the near future, PPP professionals do not have a method to design Availability 
Payment PPPs. Since MAPs and concession term are the most important parameters in 
Availability Payment PPPs, this chapter provides details about developing a hybrid model 
that would design MAPs and concession term while protecting the public and private 
interests simultaneously. The hybrid model (linear) is developed by combining stochastic 
dynamic programming (SDP) and multi-objective linear programming (MOLP) models.  
3.1 Nature of the Problem 
Availability Payment PPPs are long-term PPPs that require the private sector to perform 
and keep the highways available throughout the concession period. Since these contracts 
are long-term contracts it would be better if a method could enable integrating the effects 
of dynamic changes occurring during the term of the project in the design process. In 
addition, it was desired that the model help the decision-makers for monitoring the 
project progress and also help to take decisions upon realization of unexpected results 
occurring due to the dynamic nature of the project. In addition, since these projects are 
long-term projects, there are risks associated with uncertain events occurring. Hence, 
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stochastic dynamic programming (SDP) framework was selected to model these long-
term PPPs. 
Apart from this, the public and private sectors have competing objectives in PPPs. The 
private sector wants to earn as much as possible from the funds allocated for the project, 
while the public sector tries to minimize spending those funds to protect public interests. 
In addition, the public sector must attract the private sector by allowing them to earn at an 
appropriate internal rate of return (IRR). Hence, the PPPs must be designed to satisfy the 
competing objectives simultaneously, which necessitates that the model be developed as 
a multi-objective model. Therefore, the Availability Payment PPP model was developed 
as a multi-objective linear programming model (since all the equations that formed the 
constraints and objective function were linear).    
Thus, the dynamic, probabilistic and multi-objective characteristics of Availability 
Payment PPPs necessitated that a hybrid model be developed. This led to the 
development of a hybrid model by blending the multi-objective linear programming 
principles with a stochastic dynamic programming model. 
3.2 Developing Model for Availability Payment PPPs 
The two most important features of the Availability Payment PPPs are MAP and 
concession term. Hence, a hybrid model was developed for designing MAP and 
concession term for these PPPs. In addition, the SDP framework within the hybrid model 
was inspired by the inventory model (also known as Economic Order Quantity (EOQ) 
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Inventory model) used in supply chain management. Gabriel et al., (2004) have used the 
inventory model formulation for determining optimal forward-load estimates for the 
electric power market. The authors designed the model by setting up electric power 
market parameters in the inventory model framework. The original inventory model is 
generally used to determine optimal production strategy, taking into consideration several 
parameters, namely, production costs (variable costs), fixed costs (fixed charge costs), 
inventory storage costs (variable costs), salvage costs (variable costs) and random 
demand (Winston, 2004). When the demand is random, the model must be set up 
considering random demand and such a model falls in the category of SDP models. The 
generalized form of the classic inventory model can be expressed schematically as shown 
below: 
 
Figure 3 Inventory Model From Supply Chain Management (Source: Gabriel, 2009) 
The classic inventory model is used to determine how much quantity should be produced 
at a manufacturing plant during each month (stage) when the demand is random. The 
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model allows us to consider situations such as having initially stocked inventory and also 
the situations when the unsold items may be salvaged or trashed. 
The inventory model displayed in Figure 3 is modified for PPP projects. The analogous 
inventory model representing PPPs is shown in Figure 4. The analogy between the two 
models is listed in Table 1 and is discussed briefly in the following part of this section. 
 
Figure 4 Inventory Model Application to PPPs 
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Table 1 Analogy Between the Inventory Model and the Availability Payment Model 
Mathematical 
Term 
Inventory Model PPPs with Availability Payment 
Stage Month Years  
State Inventory Financial state of the private sector (in $M) 
Objective Function Minimize Cost Minimize Cost to DOTs and variation in private 





Maximum Availability Payment For a Given 
Concession Period (in $M) 
Initial Realization 
(Stage t) 
Initial Inventory Private sector’s financial state after construction 
phase (in $M) 
Random Variable 
(Stage t) 
Demand during a 
particular stage 
Deductions for underperformance (in $M) 
Intermediate 
Realization (Stage t+1) 
Unsold Inventory 
at stage t+1 
Financial state of private sectort+1 = Financial 
State Realized t + Availability Payment t+1 – 
Realized Deductions t+1  (in $M)) 
Element (Last stage) Left over 
inventory 
Remaining Service Life (RSL) costs (in $M) 
3.2.1 Initial Financial Condition  
In the inventory model, initial inventory influences the solution of the problem. If the 
initial inventory is high, the decision to produce in subsequent periods, derived by 
solving the model, might lead to a solution to produce less and vice versa. In PPPs with 
availability payment mechanisms, the private sector’s financial state at the beginning of 
the concession term can influence the solution in a similar way. If the financial state is 
good, the decisions can be made to have lower MAPs and vice versa. The financial state, 
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on the other hand, depends on how much private equity was allowed in the project and 
how much money was reimbursed to the private sector for its construction activities. 
Usually, the private sector will not be able to fully recover its investment at the beginning 
of the operation phase. This would mean that the private sector would be forced to 
perform during the operations phase to recover its investment and also earn the expected 
profit. 
3.2.2 Deductions 
In the classical inventory model, demand is a random variable and it influences the 
optimal decisions. The analogy of demand is deduction in the proposed model. The 
deductions applied to MAPs influence the overall reimbursement to the private sector and 
also the financial condition of the private sector. If the deductions are high, it can stress 
the financial condition of the private sector but, if the deductions are low, the public 
sector might be criticized for not considering low deductions while designing the PPP.  
3.2.3 Financial State Realized  
The classic inventory model calculates unsold stock after every stage. The unsold 
inventory becomes the initial inventory for the next stage. Using the same approach in the 
proposed model, the private sector’s financial state after a particular year (i.e., stage) will 
become the initial state for the succeeding year. If the deductions are higher, the financial 
condition will be stressed (i.e., the financial condition will have lower values), which 
may threaten the existence of the PPP contract. Hence, in that case, the public sector may 
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want to increase the amount of payment to the private sector. On the other hand, if the 
deductions are lower than expected, the private sector’s financial state can reflect 
unexpected gains to the private sector, which indicates loss to the public.  
3.2.4 Remaining Service Life and Maintenance Costs 
In the inventory model, after going through all the stages, if something is unsold it must 
be scrapped off or sold out at a salvage value. Similarly, after the transfer of the asset to 
the public sector, the asset may have some service life left in the asset. For example, the 
concession period of a PPP is 30-years and the highway is transferred back to the public 
sector. The public sector now owns all the useful life of the structure (known as 
Remaining Service Life) along with its maintenance responsibilities. The maintenance 
responsibilities will incur costs. These costs are considered in this model just as the 
unsold inventory is considered in the classical model. These costs are called Remaining 
Service Life (RSL) costs. Including RSL costs in the model will allow us to consider the 
design life cycle of the project, which generally extends beyond the concession period. 
3.2.5 Selecting State and Stages 
In this model, the private sector’s financial state is considered as the “state” of the model 
and years of operation are considered as “stages” of the model. Thus, a 30-year 
concession can be modeled to have 30 stages, and during each stage, the private sector 
takes some financial state. We can set up our model so that each year represents a stage. 
However, this will increase the computational burden significantly but will provide 
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limited value to the decision-makers since the decisions cannot be made (rather, changed) 
yearly in PPP projects. Hence, it is appropriate to reduce the number of stages.  
The stages can be reduced to a minimum of three stages (unless we do not want the 
model to have stages at all), where the first stage will represent the beginning of the 
ramp-up period of the operations phase, the second stage will represent the end of the 
ramp-up period and beginning of the operations phase, and the final stage will represent 
the end of the concession period. The ramp-up period is the initial 5 to 6 years of 
highway operations during which the highway experiences a rapid increase in traffic 
volume, but after this period the traffic volume increases at a very slow rate (Fitch, 2007). 
Hence, it is recommended here that the first stage should always be the beginning of the 
concession period and the second stage should always be considered after 5 or 6 years, 
which will enable the model to include the ramp-up period in computations. It must be 
noted here that in case of PPPs with availability payments, traffic volume will not affect 
the maximum availability payments, but by considering the second stage at the end of 
ramp-up period, it will help the model capture the private sector’s initial performance, 
which can be used to project the private sector’s performance for the rest of the 
concession term. The third stage will be the end of the concession period. The period 
between the end of ramp-up period and the end of the concession period can be divided 
by considering factors such as total years of concession period, investment amount, risk 
of failure of PPP and the time available for this analysis.  Once the stages and states are 
fixed, the model can be used to conduct analysis on the financial aspects of the project. It 
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must be noted here that since the model enables considering yearly (stage-wise) analysis 
of the project finances, real cash flows must be used in this analysis.  
3.3 Model Formulation 
The following part provides details to set up formulation for designing availability 
payment terms as well as establishing the relationship with the classical inventory model. 
3.3.1 Decision Variables  
In case of classic inventory model, the decision-maker is supposed to decide how many 
units should be produced in order to minimize the costs. In the proposed PPP model, the 
DOTs have to decide what amount should be considered for annual payments and what 
should be the duration of concession. Hence, in the proposed model, we consider 
MAPP as the decision variable. The following illustration shows how to select MAPPs for 
this model.  
Suppose that a DOT has a budget of $1Billion for the project. It invites bids from Private 
Parties disclosing the limit on MAPs. The disclosed limit of MAPs is the upper limit of 
money for the project. This allows the private sector to analyze the project and check 
whether an appropriate rate of return is attainable or not. If the project can offer a 
desirable rate of return, private party bids for the project. In this scenario the private 
party’s financial status (derived by equity cash flow statement) considering100% of 
MAPs throughout the concession period represent the upper boundary of the money that 
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could be earned from the project. On the other hand, the financial status considering the 
adjusted MAPs (i.e., reduced MAPs for contractual non-compliance) that would just 
satisfy the private party’s internal rate of return defines the lower boundary of money. 
The difference between these two boundaries represents the amount of money that is 
beyond what the private sector expects. This leads us to conclude that an ideal MAP 
design would be the one that would reduce public sector costs, but at the same time 
satisfy the private sectors internal rate of return.  
 Hence, in this analysis we select several values of MAPs (decision variables) such that 
these would let the private sector earn higher than its IRR but less than the budget 
available for the Project. This requires that the MAPs for this analysis are selected 
between the full MAP and the adjusted MAP that would allow the private sector to earn 
at an acceptable rate of return. Hence, if the public sector expects that the largest MAP 
would be $100K and MAP of $94K would satisfy the private sector’s IRR then the MAPs 
for our mode can be selected as shown in Table 2.  
Table 2 Example of Choices for Decision Variables in the Availability Payment Model 
Decision Variables MAP1 MAP2 MAP3 MAP4 MAP5 MAP6 MAP7 
Values (in $ 1000) 94 95 96 97 98 99 100 
The above table is similar to the inventory model’s decision variable, where the 
manufacturer has the option of manufacturing 0, 1, 2, 3, 4 or 5 units (since the lower limit 
is 0 and the upper limit is 5) and the decision-maker is required to make the decision on 
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what quantity to produce during a particular period. Furthermore, the decision-maker 
may also want to vary the duration of concession. Hence, if the concession term is varied 
while keeping the overall payment fixed, a similar table can be easily constructed. 
3.3.2 Objective Function 
The classical inventory model minimizes total costs of inventory management. Similarly, 
the proposed PPP model minimizes the Life Cycle Costs (LCC) to the public sector. The 
Life Cycle (LC) considered in this model includes the concession period and all the years 
between the end of concession and the second major highway upgrade/rehabilitation. 
Considering the years between the end of concession and the second major upgrade in the 
lifecycle will ensure that the model captures all the major costs beyond the concession 
period.  
Furthermore, this model has been designed as a multi-objective optimization model. In a 
multi-objective optimization model, several objectives (even conflicting and competing 
objectives) can be incorporated at the same time. In PPPs, the public sector and private 
sector play major roles in the overall success. Hence, decision models must consider the 
concerns of each party adequately, which justifies the use of a multi-objective 
optimization model for PPPs. By including private and public sector objectives, this 
model will capture the essence of PPPs, “sharing risks and rewards optimally.”  
In the current research, the objective function is formed by combining public and private 
sector objectives in a single equation. Since the method of weights (as described in 
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Section 2.6.2) will be used during analysis, these parts of the objective function are 
applied by appropriate weights. The weighted multi-objective function can be represented 
as: 
Objective Function = Minimize (Weighted Public Sector Costs + Weighted Variation of 
Private Sector’s Financial Status) 




&(  %9 ∙ |;< 2 <+|	
	
    where RSLt =          
0																			 > ?@AB	CDEE					  ?   (3.1) 
Where,   
MAPPt = Maximum Availability Payment at stage t  
 Dit = Deduction during stage t corresponding to event i ~ probabilistic distribution
 CFS t = Control Financial State at stage t 
 FSA t= Financial State Achievable at stage t 
 w1and w2 are weights for the objectives 
 p = number of decision variables considered  
 m = number of events contributing to deductions 
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 T = number of years of concession 
In the above equation, public sector cost (represented by	*+,- 2 ∑ 3&4  56) is the 
amount paid by the public sector, after having deductions from MAPs for unavailability 
of highway. Notice that the RSLt represents the costs associated with Operations and 
Maintenance of the highway after concession period. Hence these costs will only be 
added once at the end concession term. Thus, the public sector costs have been 
represented as: 
′-GHI&J  	*+,- 23&4&(  RSL	
          (3.2) 
The second part of the objective function (multiplied by w2) represents variation in 
private sector’s financial status during stage t has been formulated as: 
f’ Private = Variation of Private Sector’s Financial State 
= |Control Financial State t – Financial State Achievable t|
 
= |Control Financial State t 
 – (Financial State Realized t-1 + MAP
1 + FAst - ∑ 3&4&( )| (3.3) 
 Where,      MAP1= The biggest MAP possible  
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FAst  = Financial Adjustment at stage t when public sector selects 
MAPp  
= MAP4t - MAP
1 if public sector selects fourth MAP during 
stage t 
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Equation 3.3 can be better understood through a graphical representation. The above 
Figure 5 presents the logic behind using formulation and would help in understanding the 
MOSP model in a better way. In the figure, the inclined upper boundary represents the 
public interests and the model will not allow selection of MAPs that would enable the 
private sector finances to exceed this boundary. On the other hand, the inclined lower 
boundary represents the private interests and the model will not allow selection of MAPs 
that would reduce the private sector finances to drop below this boundary. The dotted 
arrows represent MAPs, the decision variables. Let us assume that at some stage t, the 
private sector assesses its financial condition and finds the project’s financial condition 
represented by point P1 (shown in the figure 5).   
If the public sector selects the fourth MAP option (out of the total 5 options available) 
between stage t and stage t+1, it would reach a point represented by Q3. This point 
corresponds to situation where the private sector pays all its expenses and earns 100% of 
MAP. This financial condition can be calculated algebraically by adding income 
(considering the fourth MAP option) and contractual expenses between stage t and stage 
t+1. However due to uncertainty, the private sector might not reach the point Q3 but 
might reach a point Q5 due to the deductions (the shaded area is used to show deduction). 
To calculate the financial condition represented by point Q5, we must perform the 
following operation:  
Financial State Achievable = FSR t-1 + MAP




FSR t-1 = Financial State Realized at stage (t-1) 
In addition to this, depending on the MAP selected and the deductions faced, the private 
sector would achieve the financial state represented by FSAt-1. However it is desired that 
the private sector meets the status represented by CFSt. The difference between FSAt and 
CFSt represents the variation in the private sector’s financial condition. Furthermore, 
since the optimization operator for the model is a minimization function, we must always 
have a positive value of CFSt-1 – FSAt-1 so that the difference can be minimized. This was 
achieved by taking absolute values of the difference. 
Putting all the equations together and considering weights for the two objectives as 
w1 and w2, we get the objective function for the problem as expressed in equation 3.1. 
3.3.3 Constraints 
The following section introduces the constraints that affect the overall project execution 
and results.  
3.3.3.1 Limits on the Private Sector’s Financial State 
Under ideal conditions, the private sector will meet the contractual performance 
regarding availability of highway lanes. This would enable them to get MAPs reimbursed 
without any deductions and allow them to earn the maximum possible amounts. This 
represents the upper limit of the private sector’s financial condition at a given stage 
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(represented by the upper inclined boundary in Figure 5). However, this state cannot be 
achieved and the MAPs will be reduced due to deductions. At any given stage (year), the 
private sector will continue operating and maintaining the asset if and only if the private 
sector is able to earn at a minimum acceptable rate of return. The boundary formed by 
considering all the financial states below in which the private sector would quit the 
partnership represents the lower limit of acceptable financial state and can be calculated 
by assuming a minimum rate of return for the private sector. In Figure 5, this has been 
represented by the lower inclined boundary. Mathematically, this can be represented 
below: 
f Financial State  ≤ ULP             (3.5) 
f Financial State  ≥ LLP         (3.6) 
Where,  
f  Financial State = Financial condition of a private party and is derived by accruing annual 
equity cash flow developed by including the actual money reimbursed 
(i.e., MAPs – Random Deductions) to the private sector 
ULP = Upper Limit of Payment and can be obtained by accruing annual equity cash flow 
developed by including MAPs only (i.e., no deductions applied)  
LLP = Lower Limit of Payment and can be obtained by accruing annual equity cash flow 
developed by including the reimbursements to the private sector with 
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maximum allowable deductions that would satisfy their minimum 
acceptable rate of return (MARR). 
3.3.3.2 Remaining Service Life Cost 
The Availability Payment PPPs are generally 20-40 years duration. During these 20-40 
years of concession, the concessionaire maintains the highway, but after the concession 
period, the maintenance responsibility is handed over to the public sector. The public 
sector would be required to maintain the highway for the remaining service life of the 
highway. The RSL maintenance costs will vary with the variation of concession term 
since if the concession period is smaller, and the remaining life cycle costs will be higher 
and vice versa. This happens since the increase or decrease of the concession period by 
some years will correspondingly reduce or increase the RSL maintenance costs.  
Hence, we can say that depending on the availability payment options considered for 
analysis (i.e., MAP and duration of concession), there will be a corresponding RSL 
maintenance costs. The DOTs are known to use well-established guidelines to plan 
maintenance as well as estimate costs for highways (Caltrans, 2007) as well as reports 
such as NCHRP 688 also have guidelines to estimate highway maintenance costs. Using 
these guidelines and depending on the concession period, the RSL maintenance costs can 
be estimated, which can vary with the concession terms between some upper and lower 
limits. These can be expressed as:  
f RSL cost  ≤  MaxEMCT         (3.7) 
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 f RSL cost  ≥ MinEMCT         (3.8) 
where,  
f RSL cost  represents highway’s estimated remaining service life costs (RLS Cost) 
implemented via a lookup table developed by using procedures established by 
guidelines/reports/manuals such as Determining Highway Maintenance Costs 
(NCHRP 688) or the procedures adopted by various State DOTs for maintenance 
and rehabilitation of highway networks. 
MinEMCT = Minimum Expected Post-Concession Maintenance Cost 
corresponding to T concession years 
MaxEMCT = Maximum Expected Post-Concession Maintenance Cost 
corresponding to T concession years 
3.3.4 Recursion Formula 
Winston (2004) described the processes of developing recursion formulae. If the 
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where,  
ft(FSR) = minimum value of expected public and private sector objectives that can 
be calculated for stage t by considering stages t, t + 1, … end of the problem 
given that the state at the beginning of stage t is FSR. 
p(FSA|FSR,MAPP,t) = probability that the next period’s state will be FSA, given 
that the current (stage t) state is FSR and action MAPP is chosen = SAT@	 
 Ω = set representing possible values of FSA 
This can be further simplified by appropriately substituting the values in the previous 
equations and a simplified version as shown below can be obtained: 
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          (3.10) 
Where,  
(Expected MOF|FSR, MAPP) represents the expected value of multi-objective 
function (MOF) at stage t given that the current (stage t) state is FSR and action 
MAPP is chosen 
SAT@	 = p(FSA|FSR,MAPP,t) 
3.4 Comprehensive Model 
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    where RSLt =          
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f Financial State  ≤ ULP              
f Financial State  ≥ LLP          
f RSL cost  ≤  MaxEMCT          
 f RSL cost  ≥ MinEMCT          
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3.5 Alternate Forms of the Model 
The model (3.11) represents the hybrid model, which can be used to design the MAPs, 




information, the model can be modified for analysis purposes. The model can be 
modified when the following occurs: 
1. When Information is Available 
When all the necessary information is available, the model (3.11) can be changed 
and used as a deterministic model (Appendix 2). Notice that if expected values are 
used in the model (Appendix 2) the analysis will be considered as a deterministic 
analysis. In this report the model using expected values will be called 
Multiobjective Deterministic Dynamic Programming Model (MODDP)  
2. When Probabilities Can Be Calculated or Predicted 
When the probabilities associated with random variables can be calculated we can 
use the model (3.11) directly. Such a model will be called Multiobjective 
Stochastic Dynamic Programming (MOSDP) model. 
3. When probabilities cannot be calculated or when effect of combination of extreme 
values deductions is desired 
Sometimes the probabilities cannot be calculated or we might be interested to see 
the effect of various combinations of random values on the results. In such 
conditions we can use simulations (model in Appendix 3). The model basically 
replaces the deductions with simulated values of deductions. Such a model is 
called Multiobjective Simulated Dynamic Programming (MObDP) model in this 
research work. 
In addition to these variations, the models can be further extended to include more 
objectives. This could allow the model to simultaneously satisfy several objectives of 
both the sectors. Last, the Control Financial State (CFS) used in the model can be linked 
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with several screening and performance criteria including, but not limited to, 
concessionaire’s experience, financial stability, market reputation, safety, lane 
availability, highway through put and passenger comfort. Hence, if the concessionaire is 
expected to do poorly on these criteria, the CFS can be designed and used to reflect such 
a concessionaire in the model. This would enable the decision-makers to set up the model 
specifically to a concessionaire and use it to determine the negotiable MAP and 
concession terms.  
3.6 Using the Model 
The MOSDP model (3.11) presented in Section 3.4 is developed considering a SDP 
framework. Hence, the analysis requires using backward-pass calculations wherein the 
analysis begins from the last stage and continues stepwise to reach the start of the 
problem. The method of using the backward-pass has been summarized in the following 
seven steps (adopted from Winston, 2004): 
1. “The problem must be broken into several stages.” Collectively, all these stages 
form a mechanism by which the problem can be built up. In our MOSDP model 
concession term is broken into several stages, each stage representing several 
years. When put together, the stages would represent the concession term. This 
can be better explained using Figure 5 and Figure 6 together. Figure 5 shows two 
stages: stage (t) and stage (t+1). By combining all the stages we obtain the 
concession term shown in Figure 6.  
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2. “The state at any stage gives the information needed to make the correct decision 
at the current stage.” In our model the Financial State Realized (FSRt) represents 
a state during stage t. This can be visualized using Figure 5 where states during 
stage t are represented by points P0, P1, … P5 and states during stage t+1 are 
represented by points Q0, Q1, … Q9.  
3. “In most cases, we must determine how the cost incurred during the current stage 
(t) depends on the stage t decision, the stage t state, and the value of t.” In our 
model, current stage is represented by t, decisions by MAP and state at stage t by 
FSRt. Using the objective function % ∙ c*+,- 2∑ 3&  564&( d  %9|;< 2
<5e 	*+, 		<+E 	2 	∑ 3&4&( |  allows us to achieve this objective.  
(Note that the formula used here is obtained by substituting the value of FSRt 
from equation 3.4 to equation 3.1) 
4. “We must also determine how the stage t +1 state depends on the stage t decision, 
the stage t state, and the value of t.” This was achieved by using the recursion 
formula (3.10). This recursion formula would allow us to determine the future 
stage decisions (i.e., selecting MAPs) considering future decisions (MAP), future 
stage’s state (i.e., FSRt) and the stage t itself. 
5. If we define ft(i) as the minimum cost incurred during stages t, t-1,..., T, given that 
the stage t state is i, then (in many cases) we may write ft(i) = min {(cost during 
stage t) +ft+1(new state at stage t + 1)}, where the minimum is over all decisions 
allowable in state i during stage t. A very similar methodology was adopted here. 
The recursion formulae are discussed in Section 3.3.4. The stepwise development 
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shows that similar methodology is adopted during this research. Figure 8 has been 
developed with the aim to explain this process. 
6. We begin by determining all the fT (·)’s, then all the fT-1(·)’s, and finally f1 (the 
initial state). This approach will be demonstrated during the case study analysis in 
Chapter 4. However, the backward-pass has been explained graphically using the 
Figure 5 as well as Figures 6 to 10.  
7. We then determine the optimal stage 1 decision. This leads us to a stage 2 state, at 
which we determine the optimal stage 2 decision. We continue in this fashion until 
the optimal stage T decision is found. This approach will be demonstrated during 
the case study analysis in Chapter 4. Furthermore these calculations will be 
referred as Realization Pass (or can also be referred as Forward Pass) in this 
research work because we move forward with the realization and using the 
solutions obtained during step 6. The realization pass has also been explained 




Figure 6 Stages and States for a Concession Period 
Figure 6 is developed here to explain steps 1 and 2. Notice that in Figure 6 the line OP0Q0 
represents the public sector interests, OPjQk represents the private sector interests, the Y 
axis represents private sector’s financial condition, the X axis represents the concession 
term and is divided in stages 0, 1,…. t-1, t, t+1. The financial condition between lines 
OP0Q0 and OPjQk represents the states. Hence, at stage t the acceptable states can be 
represented by P0, P1…. Pj where (j+1) is the number of states that are expected during 
stage t. Also notice, that when we focus on just two consecutive stages, we are 
concentrating on the area P0Q0PjQk. The Figure 5 used in the previous sections was just 





Private Sector Interests 
0                                                            t-1             t             t+1 


































Steps 3 and 4 can be explained using Figure 5.  It can be observed that if a decision is 
taken to execute the fourth MAP during stage t, we might find the project to reach any 
value between Q3 and Q5. Also notice that, since the fourth MAP option was used during 
stage t, the decisions for stages t+2, t+3would only be based on the states between Q3 to 
Q5 during stage t+1. Figure 8 is developed to explain step 5, but before we discuss Figure 
8, it is necessary to discuss what happens between stages when the MOSDP is run. Figure 
7 is developed to show that the model would select the optimal answers.  
 
Figure 7 Mechanics Behind the Model’s Two Stages 
Consider that at stage t the FSRt (state), represented by P1, is realized. From the current 
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public sector objective of reducing costs and private sector’s objective of reducing 
financial variation can be achieved simultaneously. If the public sector decides to offer 
MAP1 (the MAP having highest value) between stages t and t+1, the private sector’s 
financial condition will be point Q1. However, if the public sector decides to offer MAP5 
(the MAP with lowest value), then the private sector’s financial condition during stage 
t+1 will be Q4. In this scenario, if MAP5 is offered, the public sector would be able to 
save money and variation of the private sector’s financial status would also be less. 
Hence, the model would select the MAP5 option. Notice that this is shown by a full line 
arrow in the figure. Similar will be the case when the FSRt will be P4. However, when the 
FSRt is P6 (which indicates that the private sector’s financial status is low) selecting the 
MAPs offering lowest amount of money (i.e., MAP5) would allow reducing public sector 
expenses but would increase private sector’s financial variation. Hence, in such a 
scenario, the model would appropriately select the MAP option that would 
simultaneously reduce public sector expenses and variation of private sector’s financial 
status. Last, if we consider FSRt to be Pj (the state that implies just achieving private 
sector interests, i.e., just satisfying private sector’s MARR), offering MAP4 and MAP5 
would force the private sector to quit the project, since it can be seen that at stage t+1 that 
the FSR would be below the state represented by point Qk. In such a scenario, the model 
would identify the solution only from the three feasible options MAP1, MAP2 and MAP3. 
Continuing in this way, we can identify MAPs for all the possible FSRts and thus 




Figure 8 MOSDP Model Connecting Two Stages 
Similarly, the calculations can be done for stage t-1 by moving one stage behind. Note 
that when we calculate the costs associated with decisions taken during stage t-1, we 
already have the costs that are expected to occur after stage t. This matches with the 
description of step 5, where the we carry out the operation represented by ft(i) = min 
{(cost during stage t) +ft+1(new state at stage t + 1)}. Figure 8 also explains what happens 
when we start executing step 6. Upon carrying out the step 6 fully, we get a complete 
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Figure 9 MOSDP Model Run Fully Completing One Backward Propagation 
The solution can now be used to identify the MAP that would satisfy public and private 
sector objectives simultaneously. This leads us to step 7 of this procedure. This has been 
explained by Figures 10 through 12.  
After obtaining the solutions for the whole concession term (Figure 9) the public sector 
uses the solution to identify the optimal solution and offers MAP2 to the private sector 
(notice that offering MAP4 and MAP5, the lowest MAPs, would force the private sector 
to quit). The public sector offers MAP2 to the private sector at stage 0 (represented by the 
bold black arrow) and waits untill stage 1 is reached. During this time, the private sector 
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(represented by shaded area in Figure 10). The public sector observes that the private 
sector has performed well (represented by the red bold arrow) 
 
Figure 10 Realization Pass Upon Realization During First Stage 
At stage 1, the public sector observes the FSR, and according to the optimal solution, 
offers MAP3 to the private sector. As stage 2 is reached, the private sector’s FSR2 is 
realized (Figure 11). The FSR2 represents that between stage 1 and stage 2, the private 
sector performs badly and the private sector’s finds itself in a worst possible financial 
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Figure 11 Realization Pass Showing Realization Up To Second Stage 
In such a condition, the model might pick up MAPs with higher values to allow the 
private sector to recover and keep them motivated to be a part of the partnership. As done 
before, the public sector can again refer to the solution and offer the MAP that would 
satisfy public and private objectives simultaneously. Continuing stage by stage in the 
same way, the public sector can use the results to simultaneously minimize public sector 
costs as well as reduce the private sector’s financial variation. Once the final stage is 
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Figure 12 Realization Pass Complete 
Notice that as the model allows taking decisions at various stages and at each stage the 
decision depends on the realized state, the use of such a model would ensure that the 
public sector costs are reduced, and the private sector ends up with a decent return. 
Once all the results are available, the results can be analyzed using the concept of Pareto 
Optimality described in the previous chapter. The procedure explained in this section 
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Chapter 4 Availability Payment Design of Presidio Parkway Project 
This chapter provides a detailed case study demonstrating the use of the method 
described in Chapter 3. Caltrans’ Presidio Parkway Project was selected for this research 
work and this chapter designs MAPs for this project. Analysis was carried out using two 
approaches: 1) using expected values, and 2) using random values during the backward-
pass. The solutions obtained from both the approaches were then used and the model 
performance was observed simulating the private sector’s performance. The 
“intelligence” gathered from the model performance was used to further improve the 
results. This step is referred to as the realization pass in this dissertation and is described 
in the previous chapter. The analysis was carried out considering discrete uniform 
distribution and triangular distribution. 
4.1 Project Background 
Presidio Parkway, also known as the Doyle Drive Replacement Project, is a $928.8 M 
PPP project currently in the construction phase in the State of California. This project 
will replace an existing 73-year-old south access to the Golden Gate Bridge. The 
originally built structure currently serves 120,000 trips per day, but has been declared 
structurally deficient, vulnerable to earthquakes and is at the end of its design life. The 
project has been divided into two different phases. The first phase consists of four 
contracts that focus on restoring the structure to meet seismic safety standards as well as 
developing new structures and temporary detour roads for keeping the existing roadways 
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open. The next phase consists of four contracts and would ensure that the traffic is back 
on the permanently replaced facility (Caltrans, 2010).  
The second phase of project was considered for delivery through different procurement 
options. The project consultants Arup/Parsons Brinkenhoff Joint Venture considered 
Design-Bid-Build (DBB), Design-Build-Finance (DBF) and Design-Build-Finance-
Operate-Maintain (DBFOM) options for delivering the project. Their analysis showed 
that using the DBFOM option was better than using traditional DBB and the DBF options 
(Caltrans, 2010) because it: 
1. offered better Value for Money (VfM) over the life of the project,  
2. enabled optimal risk transfer,  
3. offered greater certainty of cost and schedule at and after financial close,  
4. promised the best use of public funds, and  
5. ensured optimal level of Operations and Maintenance (O&M) service. 
The analysis report shows that by using the DBFOM option, the Caltrans’ project costs 
would be reduced by at least 20%.  
On the basis of above information, the Presidio Parkway Project was decided to be 
procured as a DBFOM project with a concession period of 33-years (3years’ construction 
and 30-years to operate and maintain). The public sector invited bids for the project and 
limited the MAmulti-objectivePs to $35.53M. The amount consists of MAP for design 
($30M) and MAP for O&M costs ($5.53M). At that time, it would have helped the public 
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sector to offer MAP limit to a level that would have helped the public sector to save 
money as well as ensure that the private sector bid for the project and remain in the 
project until the end. Hence, the MOSDP model was used to design the limit on MAP 
during the bidding phase.   
During the bidding, it was observed that the private sector submitted bids with various 
financial plans and various construction costs. The reduction of construction costs and the 
financial plans contributed towards reduced project costs. The bidding helped in 
identifying the bidder offering the best value. On December 31, 2010, a DBFOM project 
agreement was signed between Caltrans and Gold Link Partners (the concessionaire 
(project company) formed by Hochtief, Meridiam, Flatiron, Kiewit and HNTB) (Saage & 
Ajise, 2010). By virtue of this agreement the Gold Link Partners (GLP) are now required 
to design, build and finance the project as well as operate and maintain the asset up to 
2043. Upon meeting the performance standards (that includes availability of highway), 
the Caltrans would pay GLP availability payments.  
Comparison of the business case submitted by consultant Arup/Parsons Brinkenhoff Joint 
Venture and the DBFOM agreement shows that the concessionaire would be able to 
perform construction activity for $254.03M and including other expenses (such as 
Special Purpose Vehicle Costs, O&M costs during construction, development costs, 
interests during construction and financing fees), the GLP would be responsible for 
paying $339.15M (source: Presidio Parkway Financial Proposal, 2010). This amount is 
much smaller than the construction cost of $477M estimated by consultant in February 
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2010. This resulted in GLP offering concessionaire services at MAPs of $28.5M, which 
is much lesser than the limiting MAP of $35.53M. The project document revealed that 
GLP could achieve such a big difference in MAPs by its unique financial plan. In 
addition, it is also assumed here that the concessionaire would be able to reduce the 
construction costs by $137.85M ($477M-$339.15M), since it expects to perform 
efficiently or it is just taking risks or it has precise information about the project 
conditions leading to reduced project uncertainty or the project scope getting reduced.   
The reduction of MAPs and the overall costs are very encouraging and any public sector 
would willingly accept such a bid proposal. However, the public sector must not forget 
that even at the reduced project costs the private sector is expecting good returns from the 
project. Hence, the public sector must evaluate the bids and estimate the rate of return 
expected by bidders. This kind of evaluation might show that: a) the private sector being 
extremely efficient would be able to reduce the overall project costs and is expecting a 
reasonable rate of return, b) the private sector, being extremely efficient, would be able to 
reduce the overall project costs and is expecting high rate of return, c) the private sector 
is taking unnecessary risks just to win bidding, and d) the private sector is over optimistic 
about the project success. In addition to these scenarios, the private sector might be new 
to long-term projects or might be unaware of the conditions in the region. All these 
conditions could lead public loss since these conditions could yield too much profit to the 
private sector or increase the risk of the private sector’s withdrawal from the project. 
Therefore, it is very important for the public sector to evaluate the bids, considering 
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uncertainties that could affect the project success. In addition, the public sector must also 
be able to design MAPs and a concession term that could be used during negotiations.  
Hence, the MOSDP model would be used again to identify the negotiation terms. The 
MAPs and concession term designed using bids will be represented by MAP' and 
Concession Term'. The results from these designs will also be helpful for validating the 
MOSDP model.  
4.2 Model Initialization and Assumptions 
The MOSDP model discussed in the previous chapter must be set up to the pre-award 
condition for analysis. Following part of this section presents the process used to set up 
the MOSDP model for the case study.  
4.2.1 Objective Function 
The objective function for this research can be expressed as (as discussed in detail in 
Section 3.3.2, equation 3.1) 
*+,-  arg	*+,- 	∑ g% ∙ hc*+,- 2 ∑ 3&4&( d  56ij̀(  %9 ∙ |;< 2 <+|	
    where RSLt =          
0																			 > ?@AB	CDEE					  ? 
The objective function requires values of MAP, deductions, control financial state, 
financial state achievable and weights.  
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4.2.1.1 Selecting MAPs – Decision Variable 
The MAP term in the objective function is a decision variable and we wish to determine 
the optimal value of the MAP that would minimize public sector costs as well as 
minimize variation in private sector’s financial condition. Hence, we can define a range 
of values (continuous) between the highest and the lowest possible MAPs and then 
calculate the optimal MAP (Eschenbach et al., 1995 and Srinivasan, 2007). But, wanting 
the model to identify optimal MAP from a continuous range can pose the following 
issues: 
Curse of Dimensionality: Stochastic Dynamic Programming (SDP) models are cursed for 
dimensionality (Gabriel et al., 2004). When SDPs with continuous values are used, the 
computational challenge can increase exponentially (See Appendix 13). This may require 
computers with very high computation capacity as well as much longer times to solve the 
problem. However, the problem at hand does not require a very high computational 
accuracy (reasons explained in ii) below); hence, if the SDPs are used with discrete 
values of MAPs, the computational burden can be reduced significantly and the problem 
can be solved using a routine personal computer (Windows 7, Intel i3 processor).  
Rounding-up the Values – A Common Practice in Construction 
Values are always rounded to the nearest 10s, 100s, 1,000s, millions or billions in the 
construction industry. For example, when a construction cost estimate is prepared, the 
values are rounded up: a cost of $1,580,329.07 will be rounded up as $1.6M or $1.58M. 
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Since the numbers are rounded up during the project, it would provide limited value to 
the overall results. Hence, this case study formulates the MOSDP with just five MAP 
values. In addition the financial states (FSRt, FSAt and CFSt) will be rounded up to the 
nearest integer values. 
The Presidio Parkway Project document shows that the project would have 33-years of 
concession. These 33 years includes 3 years of construction and 30 years of O&M. The 
inclusion of 3 years of construction in concession term is different from the general 
definition of concession adopted by FHWA’s Innovate Program Delivery and hence in 
this research designing the concession term would mean that designing the O&M 
concession only. During the 30-years of O&M concessions the concessionaire would be 
eligible for receiving $30M for design (constant throughout the term) and $5.53M for 
O&M (adjusted for inflation). When adding up this amount, the availability payment for 
the first year adds up to $35.53M and, after 30-years of operations, this amount increases 
to $40.48M (approximately). The Appendix H of Presidio Parkway Business Case 
provides the payment plan to the private sector. These payments are shown in the 
Appendix 4. 
For the purpose of analysis, we also use the values of $33.93M, $34.33M, $34.73M, 
$35.13M and $35.53M as MAPs in this model. The lowest value of $33.93 is selected 
here since the annual deduction (calculated in the next step) is $1.66M for satisfying 
private sector’s expected minimum acceptable rate of return (MARR). The other values 
of MAPs (viz. $34.33M, $34.73M and $35.13M) are selected as per the discussion in 
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Section 3.3.1. It is expected that the model would be able to select one MAP (dominant 
MAP) that minimizes the overall cost to the public sector as well as reduces the overall 
variation of private sector’s finances. 
4.2.1.2 Deductions  
As described earlier (Section 3.2.2), the deductions are random. These deductions occur 
due to factors such as crashes, breakdowns, regular maintenance, periodic maintenance, 
weather and any other factor that can result in the non-availability of highway lanes. The 
Presidio Parkway contract enlists all such activities and factors that can be contributed 
towards unavailability of highway lanes (Tables 4.1 and 4.2 of Presidio Parkway Project 
(2010b)). Furthermore, the contract documents clearly define the amount of deduction for 
each and every activity and factor (Appendix 5). The deductions are categorized in the 
contract documents as shown below.  
1. Inspection & Reporting 
2. Flexible Pavement Related 
3. Rigid Pavement and Bridge Deck Related 
4. Slopes, Drainage and Vegetation Related 
5. Littering and Debris Related 
6. Landscaping Related 
7. Storm Water Related 
8. Structures Related 
9. Tunnel Systems Related  
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10. ITS and Communications Related 
11. Electrical Systems Related 
12. Traffic Guidance Related 
13. Storm and Other Major Damage Related 
14. Incident Response Related 
15. Sustainability Management Plan Reporting Related  
The deductions are heavier if the unavailability occurs during rush hours, but they are 
lighter during the off rush hours (Appendix 6).  
Although an extensive list of disruptive events contributing towards non-availability of 
highways and their frequencies are available in project documents, the probability of 
occurrence of these events is not available. Several data sets were accessed to obtain 
probability of occurrence of events that can reasonably fit the Presidio Parkway’s 
climatic conditions and type of pavement, but such data was not available. Hence, it was 
decided to assume a reasonable probability distribution for deductions. The selection of 
probability distribution was influenced by the following factors:  
The deductions would have an upper limit and a lower limit. Hence, the distribution for 
deductions must be a closed distribution. This mandates that we can only use 
distributions such as Uniform, Triangular or Beta distribution to represent deductions.  
If an efficient private sector wins the bid, the mean of the deduction for such a private 
sector would be much lower. On the other hand, if the private sector is inefficient, the 
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mean of the deductions would be much higher. Since at this stage (i.e., before bid award) 
the public sector does not know anything about the private sector’s efficiency, assuming 
any value of mean (high or low) could lead to several issues. If the mean is selected high, 
the model would consider higher deductions and thus represent an inefficient private 
sector. This would imply that when higher values of deduction are fed in the MOSDP 
model, the model might (very likely to occur) design higher MAP for the contract. This 
could mean that since the mean of deduction was set at a higher value, the public sector 
pays higher MAPs to hedge the risk of private sector’s failure. On the other hand, the 
scenario where the deductions are selected lower conveys that the private sector is highly 
efficient and thus the model might (very likely to occur) design smaller MAPs increasing 
the risk of private sector failure. Therefore, for this case study it is inappropriate to 
assume a mean of the deductions. This implies that using discrete uniform distribution 
would be most appropriate. Additionally, the use of discrete uniform distribution enables 
allocating equal probability to each and every outcome that was considered to be 
appropriate for the analysis.   
In addition, when solving the MOSDP using probabilities, the calculations would include 
the distributional effects of the deductions. Hence, analysis will be conducted considering 
discrete uniform distribution and triangular distribution. In addition, the results might 
show some interesting changes if the values of random variables are simulated 
considering different distributions. So, when using MObDP model, the analysis will be 




Figure 13 NPV of Equity Cash Flows (With 100% Highway Availability) 
To use the distributions, we must estimate the parameters of the distribution. Since the 
distributions should be closed, it will be necessary to estimate the range of the 
distribution. For Presidio Parkway Project, the minimum value of deduction is zero but 
we must also estimate the maximum value of deduction. This was done by developing 
and using equity cash flow statements.  
The equity cash flows were obtained by collecting the information about expenses and 
costs and then putting them together (Appendix 7). Following calculations were carried 



























 Equity Investment 
     Construction Cost Financing Charges 
  + Taxes 
  + Operation Costs 
  + Maintenance & Rehabilitation Costs 
  + Senior Debt Repayment 
  + TIFIA Repayment 
     Total Expenses 
Earnings 
     Availability Payment (Design and Financing) 
  + Availability Payment (O&M Part) 
     Total Earnings 
Equity Cash Flows (Total Earnings - Total Expenses) 
Several assumptions were made during these calculations since all the information was 
not available. For example, the profit expected to be earned by the private sector at the 
end of construction phase has been assumed to be 3% in these calculations. However, it 
must be noted that the actual construction cost can be much less (and thus the profit may 
be much higher than the 3% assumed here) and since the project jobs are subcontracted 
(or even sub-subcontracted) it might happen that the profits added at every level of 




In the case of the Presidio Parkway Project, the private sector’s equity cash flows (Table 
3) show that the private sector will get an IRR of 13.56% (for 100$% availability of 
highway). This number is obtained by developing an equity cash flow statement using 
government documents that were prepared when the private sector was not known. The 
value of 13.56% was derived by making assumptions about the private sector’s profit 
margin and its financial structure. Hence, a value of 13.56% has been accepted here for 
this research work with reservations. Assuming that the private sector will not want to 
work at an IRR of less than 11.50%, we want to estimate the yearly deductions that 
would reduce the private sector’s IRR from 13.56% to 11.50%. 
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Table 3 Equity Cash flow For The Private Sector 
Year 
Equity Cash 
Flow ($M) Year 
Equity Cash 
Flow ($M) Year 
Equity Cash 
Flow ($M) 
2009 -50.00 2021 7.62 2033 9.67 
2010 0.00 2022 6.40 2034 8.50 
2011 0.00 2023 7.93 2035 10.07 
2012 0.00 2024 6.72 2036 8.91 
2013 15.95 2025 8.25 2037 10.49 
2014 14.95 2026 7.04 2038 9.33 
2015 17.11 2027 8.58 2039 10.92 
2016 5.55 2028 7.38 2040 9.77 
2017 7.71 2029 8.92 2041 11.37 
2018 5.75 2030 7.73 2042 10.23 
2019 7.98 2031 9.29 2043 16.47 
2020 6.10 2032 8.11 
 
The annual deductions that would drop the private sector’s IRR from 13.56% to 11.5% 
came out to be $1.66M. The equity cash flow values obtained by deducting $1.66M from 
the above Table 3 would be useful to construct the lower boundary for the model 
(discussed in Section 4.2.2.1).   
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4.2.1.3 Variation in Private Sector’s Financial Status 
The variation in the private sector’s financial variation is the difference between CFSt+1 
and FSAt+1, as discussed in Section 3.3.2 and described using Figure 5. The variation is 
dependent on private sector’s performance and thus the deductions. It was observed that 
the formula that calculates variation (equation 3.4) includes MAP1, FSR t-1, CFS t-1, FA
s
 t, 
and deductions. Notice that the variation in state at any stage t would only depend on 
FSRt-1 and the deductions since all other terms are constants. Other terms must be 
obtained and are described below: 
The MAP1 for this project is $35.53M (as described in Section 4.2.1.1). 
The FSRt-1, which stands for Financial State Realized, is a value that would be realized at 
stage t-1. The model would generate this value on its own representing the private 
sector’s financial condition.  
CFSt-1, which stands for Control Financial State, represents the state at which the public 
sector wants the private sector to be. The values of CFS can be linked to the expected 
private sector’s performance indicators (as discussed in Section 3.5) and an appropriate 
value can be derived. However, since the current case study calculations are carried out at 
a time when the private sector was not known, the CFS value must be selected with some 
judgment. If the private sector is expected to be very efficient, the CSF value can be set 
near the lower boundary (as shown in Figure 5). Conversely, if the private sector is 
expected to be not so efficient, the CFS must be set up more towards the upper boundary. 
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Setting up the value of CSF towards the lower boundary would mean that if the private 
sector’s financial state is lower, the model would recognize very small values of variation 
and might select smaller MAPs more often. But, if the CSF is set up near the upper 
boundary and if the private sector’s financial state is low, the model might pick up larger 
MAPs to reduce the variations. For this research work, the CFS was selected to be 
approximately between the model’s lower boundary and one eighth of the deduction.   
In this research work five MAPs were considered: $33.93M, $34.33M, $34.73M, 
$35.13M and $35.53M. It was necessary to consider each MAP during analysis. When 
solving the MOSDP problem manually, we could conveniently use each MAP value and 
find the results. However, MS Excel was used in this research to model the problem and 
because of the modeling constraints, it was necessary to introduce a term that could 
identify each MAP. Hence, the term FAP t was introduced in the calculations that just 
represented the difference between the MAPs. Hence, FAP t for the current case study can 
be calculated as below: 
FA1 t for MAP
1= 35.53 – 35.53 = 0.00 
FA2 t for MAP
2= 35.13 – 35.53 = – 0.40  
FA3 t for MAP
3= 34.73 – 35.53 = – 0.80 
FA4 t for MAP
4= 34.33 – 35.53 = – 1.20 
FA5 t for MAP
5= 33.93 – 35.53 = – 1.60 
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The FApt values used above are valid if the difference between two stages is one year. 
However, for our analysis the difference between two stages will be five years and, 
hence, FApt values calculated above must be multiplied by 5.  
The deductions have already been discussed in the previous section.  
4.2.2 The Constraints  
Two sets of constraints are used in this research work. The first set of constraints defines 
the lower and upper boundary for the model (thus protecting public and private sector 
interests respectively); the second constraint enables the model to consider post-
concession maintenance costs in the model. Both constraints are discussed in the 
following paragraphs:  
4.2.2.1 Determining States and Stages 
 Section 3.2.5 discusses selecting stages and states for the model. Following the 
description, the O&M period of the model was divided into six stages. For each stage, it 
was required to estimate the financial states that can be expected. To calculate the states, 
equity cash flow statements were used.  
Section 4.2.1.2 provided information about developing equity cash flow statements. The 
values of equity cash flows for 100% availability of highway (i.e., no deduction) are 
displayed in table 4. If these values are used and added every year, we obtain the 
cumulative values of the private sector’s finances representing the upper limit (since there 
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is no deduction). On the other hand, if we apply yearly deductions of $1.66M to the 
equity cash flow statement for the whole O&M period we can obtain the equity cash flow 
statements representing the lower limit of the private sector’s financial condition. By 
adding these values we obtain cumulative values that form a boundary representing the 
private sector’s financial lower limit. The following table provides the boundaries 
obtained using this approach for Presidio Parkway Project.  
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2009 -50.00 -50.00 2027 83.64 58.67 
2010 -50.00 -50.00 2028 91.02 64.39 
2011 -50.00 -50.00 2029 99.94 71.64 
2012 -50.00 -50.00 2030 107.67 77.71 
2013 -34.05 -35.72 2031 116.96 85.33 
2014 -19.10 -22.43 2032 125.07 91.78 
2015 -1.98 -6.98 2033 134.74 99.78 
2016 3.57 -3.09 2034 143.24 106.62 
2017 11.28 2.96 2035 153.31 115.02 
2018 17.02 7.04 2036 162.22 122.27 
2019 25.00 13.35 2037 172.71 131.09 
2020 31.10 17.79 2038 182.04 138.76 
2021 38.72 23.74 2039 192.96 148.01 
2022 45.12 28.48 2040 202.73 156.12 
2023 53.05 34.74 2041 214.09 165.82 
2024 59.77 39.80 2042 224.32 174.39 
2025 68.02 46.38 2043 240.80 189.19 




4.2.2.2 Determining Post-Concession O&M Costs 
As described in the sections 3.2.4 and 3.3.3.2, the duration of concession will have a 
direct impact on the RSL costs. The longer the duration, the lesser the maintenance costs 
will be. The cost of maintenance expected for periodic maintenance of a highway can be 
calculated using NCHRP 688 or other guidelines/manuals developed by the State 
Agencies. However, this is not required since project documents shows that the 
remaining life cycle costs for this project will be $591M. 
4.2.3 Assumptions 
The following assumptions were made during the analysis: 
a) Deductions were assumed to follow uniform discrete distribution (triangular 
distribution will also be considered at a later stage). 
b) The private sector earns 3% of construction costs ($501) as profit before the operations 
phase.  
c) The private sector expects a MARR of 11.5%. (Note that as per the equity cash flows, 
the private sector gets IRR of 13.56%). Hence, the private sector expects annual 
deductions not more than $1.664M. 
d) Events causing deductions are independent of each other. 
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e) The concept of “roll-over” of funds saved due to smaller deductions was not allowed 
here. This means that if in the initial years deductions are very small, then the extra 
earning/savings will not be allowed to cover for larger deductions occurring during the 
later years. 
f) The calculations displayed above did not change the distribution of deductions through 
the stages. However, the model is developed in such a way that distribution can be 
changed at every stage. 
4.3 Model Calculations 
Once all the information about the Presidio Parkway Project is available, we can begin 
with the backward-pass calculations. The following explanation focuses on using 
expected values during calculations and thus it explains the MODDP model. The changes 
that must be considered when using other forms of the hybrid model will be discussed 
towards the end of this section.  
The backward-pass calculations start from the last stage and then move towards the 
beginning of the project. The following steps were taken to during the backward-pass 
calculations: 
1. Divide concession in stages 
For this research, we divided the concession into six stages.  
2. Calculate possible states 
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We start with the last stage. As per table 4 we can see that at stage 6 (year 2038) there 
will be 53 financial states, since the model can take values from 138 to 182. 
3. Calculate expected deduction 
In this research work we have considered deductions as random variables and are 
assumed to follow the discrete uniform distribution as explained in Section 4.2.1.2 (Note: 
the triangular distribution would also be used to estimate the effect of change in 
distribution on the overall results). In this case study, we use the lower limit of 
deductions as 0, i.e., the parameter a = 0. The deductions can be as high as the value of 
the MAP. As explained in Section 4.2.1.2, the maximum acceptable annual deduction of 
$1.66M will represent the parameter b of discrete uniform distribution. Thus, we get the 
expected deductions as: 
Expected Deduction  = d1p1 + d2p2 + …… dnpn 
 d1, d2…. dn are the discrete deduction that can occur  
 p1, p2…. pn are the probabilities associated with the discrete values of deduction  
 d1 = Minimum Deduction = 0 
 dn = Maximum Deduction = $1.66M  
Expected Deduction  = (0/167)+(0.01/167)+(0.02/167)+…+ (1.66/167) 
   = $ 0.83 M  
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4. Create a table consisting of all combinations of states and decision variables.  
This leads to the following table. [Note: since the difference between two stages is 5 
years the values are multiplied by 5 during calculations
94 
 
Table 5 Part of MOSDP at Stage 6 
State 
Decision 








(Adding Current & 
Next Stage) 
Decision and 







 Equation (3.1) 
[i.e., w1Obj.1 + 
w2Obj.2] 
Equation 






182 33.93 165.5 31.61 152.111 229 684.011 
684.011 33.93 
182 34.33 167.5 33.61 154.111 231 686.011 
182 34.73 169.5 35.61 156.111 233 688.011 
182 35.13 171.5 37.61 158.111 235 690.011 
182 35.53 173.5 39.61 160.111 237 692.011 
181 33.93 165.5 30.61 152.011 228 683.911 
683.911 33.93 
181 34.33 167.5 32.61 154.011 230 685.911 
181 34.73 169.5 34.61 156.011 232 687.911 
181 35.13 171.5 36.61 158.011 234 689.911 
181 35.53 173.5 38.61 160.011 236 691.911 
 
 
139 33.93 165.5 11.39 150.089 186 1E+12 
685.189 34.73 
139 34.33 167.5 9.39 151.689 188 1E+12 
139 34.73 169.5 7.39 153.289 190 685.189 
139 35.13 171.5 5.39 154.889 192 686.789 
139 35.53 173.5 3.39 156.489 194 688.389 
Note: w1 = 0.9 and w2 = 0.1 (for all the calculations) 
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135 33.93 165.5 24.15 151.365 170 834.176 
834.176 33.93 
135 34.33 167.5 26.15 153.365 172 836.376 
135 34.73 169.5 28.15 155.365 174 838.576 
135 35.13 171.5 30.15 157.365 176 840.776 
135 35.53 173.5 32.15 159.365 178 842.976 
134 33.93 165.5 23.15 151.265 169 833.976 
833.976 33.93 
134 34.33 167.5 25.15 153.265 171 836.176 
134 34.73 169.5 27.15 155.265 173 838.376 
134 35.13 171.5 29.15 157.265 175 840.576 
134 35.53 173.5 31.15 159.265 177 842.776 
 
 
100 33.93 165.5 10.85 150.035 135 Not Feasible 
838.024 35.53 
100 34.33 167.5 8.85 151.635 137 Not Feasible 
100 34.73 169.5 6.85 153.235 139 838.424
100 35.13 171.5 4.85 154.835 141 838.224 
100 35.53 173.5 2.85 156.435 143 838.024 
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Notice that in Table 5 the heading consists of two rows and the second row provides 
reference equations used to derive the values. The steps are repeated again for stage 5 and 
we obtain a similar table. However, the calculations are briefly explained in the following 
section.  
5. Use Recursion Formula To Link Two Stages  
Consider the situation when the Financial State at stage 5 is 100. In that condition, if the 
MAP options of $33.93M and $34.33M are used, the project will end up at states 135 and 
137, respectively (column 6 of table 6). Since these states do not exist in stage 6, the 
model would not find any value when it uses the recursion formula. In practical terms, 
this means that the partnership would break.  
However, if the option of $34.73M is offered, the project would have a state of 139 
during stage 6. The recursion formula of the model would now search the state of 139 in 
the stage 6 table, find the value of objective function that would be minimum and add it 
with the objective function for stage 5.  
From table 5, it is evident that during stage 6 for a state of 139, the minimum objective 
function value is 685.189 (for MAP of 34.73). Hence, during stage 5 calculations, we use 
a value of $685.189M from stage 6 and add it with the current value of objective 
function, which is 153.235 (Column 5). By adding these two values, we get $828.424M. 
Similar calculations can be done when the project would have states of 141 and 143. 
When we compare the objective value functions (column 7), we observe that 838.024 is 
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the lowest value of the objective function and hence we must select MAP of $35.53M 
during stage 5.   
These steps can be repeated for all the states (from 100 to 135) for stage 5. This would 
give us all the values for all the states in stage 5. Notice that by using the recursion 
formula in column 7 we are actually adding the objective function value up to stage 5 
(column 5) with the expected values of objective function for the remaining stages.  
These steps must be repeated for stages 4, 3, 2, and then 1. Once we reach stage 1, we 
complete the analysis and we obtain a solution set. The solution calculations for all the 
stages and states are included in Appendix 8.  
4.4 Results and Analysis 
Appendix 8 includes all the calculations for the backward-pass and the final solutions. 
Using these solution sets, we can determine the optimal MAP. Assuming that the private 
sector enters the construction phase with a financial state of -$34M (negative sign implies 
that the private sector has not yet reached the breakeven point), we can observe that the 
optimal solution would consist of following MAPs: 
Table 7 Optimal MAPs Selected By MODDP Model 
  Stage 1 Stage 2 Stage 3 Stage 4 Stage 5 Stage 6 
Optimal MAPs ($M) 34.73 35.13 34.73 34.73 34.33 33.93 
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When this model was developed, it was expected that the model would select MAPs that 
would remain very close to the control points throughout all the stages. However, the 
optimal MAPs that became a part of the optimal solution varied unexpectedly. Hence, it 
was not possible to identify one convincing MAP as a solution.  
Table 7 provides the stage-wise occurrence of each MAP. It is evident from the above 
table that if we consider the MAP occurring during Stage 1 as our Design MAP, then we 
should select $34.73M. Also, this MAP occurred maximum number of times (3 out of 6 
times) during the concession.  
This solution perfectly fits with the actual PPP practice where the MAPs are contractually 
finalized during the bidding phase and remains unchanged throughout the concession 
term. However, the MAPs during stage 5 and stage 6 are smaller than the MAP of 
$34.73M, hence, if MAP of $34.73M is adjudged as the optimal MAP, then we would 
miss the cost savings realized towards the end of concession. Hence, the MAPs were 
averaged to estimate the MAP. The model could have been modified to discourage 
change of MAPs during the concession term by introducing a penalty constraint. The 
penalty function would have been introduced using the following if-then-else logic: 
If   the changing MAPs is costs less than penalty  
and changing MAPs would not increase financial variation for the private sector 
then change the MAP 




This might require inclusion of some binary variables that would impose a penalty if 
MAPs are changed (by taking a value of 1) and would have not affected the results if 
MAPs did not change (by taking a value of 0). However, adding additional penalty 
constraint mandated the use of actual amount of money required to make contractual 
changes. These details are not available (especially in the United States) since PPPs are 
new to the United States, and there are very few examples where contractual changes 
were made to PPPs and the extra amount incurred due to contractual changes is generally 
not easily available or, if it is available, then it is categorized as transaction costs that also 
include several other contractual fees. Hence, the design MAP was obtained by using the 
average of values obtained during the analysis. This gives us a design MAP of $34.597M. 
In the previous paragraphs, the analysis was conducted on the basis of several 
assumptions. One of the assumptions included using expected value of deductions. This 
assumption closely resembles the industry practice of using expected values. In addition 
the approach is very similar to the deterministic approach described by Winston 
(Winston, 2004). So the approach and the model described above would be referred as 
Multi-objective Deterministic Dynamic Programming model (MODDP). It is a known 
fact that when deterministic approach is used the analysis would yield values ignoring the 
randomness. Hence, the analysis discussed in Section 4.3 was repeated again to include 
probabilities into calculations and thus get stochastic solutions for the problem at hand.  
In the revised analysis, two different approaches i.e., MOSDP and MObDP were used. In 
the first approach the model was run again, but this time probabilities were included in 
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the analysis and the model was run such that for each state the deductions were varied 
between the upper and lower limits. For each discretized value of deduction, objective 
function values were calculated for all the remaining stages. These objective functions 
values were multiplied by the probabilities of their occurrence (thus satisfying the second 
part of recursion formula (3.11)) and then stored in a temporary variable. The process 
was repeated for all the values of deductions and the values were cumulatively added to 
the temporary variable. Thus upon analyzing the whole range of deductions, we would 
get a stochastic value of future’s possible stages. Using this approach for all other states 
and all the stages (going from last stage to first stage) would complete the analysis and 
would provide a stochastic solution. This approach, of solving the model 3.11 will give 
us stochastic solution and hence justifies the name Multiobjective Stochastic Dynamic 
Programming (MOSDP) model. Since this approach requires several iterative 
calculations for each state, VBA Excel Macros were developed to automate the process. 
Table 8 Optimal MAPs Selected by MOSDP Model 
  Stage 1 Stage 2 Stage 3 Stage 4 Stage 5 Stage 6 
Optimal MAPs ($M) 35.13 34.73 34.73 34.73 34.73 34.33 
As described in the MODDP case, here also the values changed throughout the 




In the second approach randomly generated deductions following different distributions 
(discrete uniform and triangular) were used instead of using probabilities or using 
expected deductions. This would allow the model to go through extreme values of 
deductions and thus provide solutions that can be used for hedging extreme risks of 
failure. Here also a VBA Excel Macro was developed to automate the process and Monte 
Carlo Simulations were used. Using the Macros 1000 backward propagation cycles were 
run and results as displayed below were obtained. 
Table 9 Distribution of MAPs (MOklDP model) 
Decision 
Variable 
Occurrence Of Each MAP During Each Stage 




MAP = 33.93 109 32 37 154 329 964 1625 
MAP = 34.33 241 205 213 228 212 36 1135 
MAP = 34.73 267 223 230 239 209 0 1168 
MAP = 35.13 222 254 218 201 142 0 1037 
MAP = 35.53 161 286 302 178 108 0 1035 
Total Occurrence 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 
The distribution for these results also shows that if we consider that the MAP that 
occurred maximum times during Stage 1 must be selected as design MAP, then we 
should select $34.73M (since it was selected 267 times by the model). But, if we consider 
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maximum occurrence of a MAP through the concession as the criteria for identifying 
Design MAP', then, we must select $33.93M (since it was selected 1625 times) as Design 
MAP'. Here also, since both the criteria are pointing towards different values, it is not 
very obvious which MAP out of $35.93M and $34.73M must be considered as optimal 
MAP. Hence, the Design MAP' was again obtained by taking average across the 
concession period. Design MAP' obtained from such an analysis was $34.6448M.  
4.4.1 Value of Stochastic Solution 
Here, we solved the problem with expected values, probabilistic values and random 
values. When we use expected values, the problem corresponds to the “Expected Value 
Problem” defined by Birge and Louveaux (1997) as a problem solved by using expected 
values for stochastic variables (without any recourse). In addition, the authors also 
defined Recourse Problems (RP) as a “two-stage problem” wherein the decision-makers 
must decide “here-and-now” and make a decision. This RP model corresponds (to some 
extent) with the six-stage MOSDP model used in this research work.  The biggest 
difference between the RP model and the six-staged models used in this research is that – 
in the RP model stages are considered in sequence but in this research work the stages are 
considered in reverse sequence. Thus, considering the six-stage MOSDP model as a six-
staged recourse problem, we can calculate Value of Stochastic Solution (VSS) as: 
VSS = EEV – RP          (4.3) 
For the current research, EEV represents the costs to the public sector if the MAPs are 
obtained using expected values (without recourse, as well). This requires us to use a 
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model that can avoid recourses but use the expected values. This can be done by 
changing the model described in Section 3.4. The first change required in the model was 
to remove the stages and run the model as a model covering the full concession period. 
This would mean that we would just be concerned about the beginning of the concession 
period and the end-of-concession period. The MOSDP model (equation 3.11) can be 
changed to fit such a requirement by reducing the stages from six to one and by using the 
expected values instead of random values. The model obtained by making these changes 
is included in Appendix 9. This model would graphically look as shown in the Figure 14.  
  
Figure 14 Single Stage Model Using Expected Deductions (Without Recourse) 
This model gave the objective function value of $1,444.94M representing the EEV for 
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(with recourse) the objective function value of $1,448.53M was obtained representing the 
RP. This leads us to the following calculations: 
VSS  = EEV – RP 
 = (-1444.94) – (-1448.53) 
VSS = $3.59M > 0 
Notice that the VSS is positive, which indicates that when the MOSDP is used with 
random values, it gives us more conservative results to manage the randomness.  [Note: 
The VSS of all the analyses conducted in this dissertation are documented in Appendix 
10] 
4.4.2 Pareto Optimality 
As discussed in Section 2.6.2, we wish to obtain the efficient frontier from the above 
analysis. Hence, the models (using expected values and random values) were run again 
by varying the weights. This helped identify the optimal combinations of public sector 
costs and financial variations. For the deterministic model, the calculations were done 




Figure 15 Pareto Efficient Frontier from MODDP Model 
Then, the line joining the four points defines the Pareto Efficient Frontier. The line can be 
used by decision-makers to select their strategy depending on their utility.  
Similarly, the model developed for allowing probabilistic values as well as random 
deductions was run for obtaining the Pareto Efficient Frontier. The analysis of the results 













































Figure 16 Pareto Efficient Frontier from MOSDP Model 
The Pareto Efficient Frontier obtained from the MOSDP model resembles closely with 
the Pareto Efficient Frontier obtained from the MODDP model frontier. In both the cases 
the frontiers have been obtained by varying the weights from 0.01 to 1.00 and in both the 
cases we just get a few points that represent the feasible region as well as the Pareto 
Efficient Frontiers.   
The analysis was carried out for MObDP model with the hope to observe the effect of 
randomness in deductions and various combinations on the Pareto Efficient Curve. The 
















































Figure 17 Pareto Efficient Frontier Considering Random Values 
The curve obtained by joining the selected points (lying towards the south west direction 
of the feasible region) is believed to approximate the Pareto Efficient Frontier. For a 
perfect Pareto Efficient Frontier the simulations must be run to an extent ensuring 
inclusion of every point in the feasible region. This can consume a very large amount of 
time as compared to the time available to select the concessionaire and sign the contract 
during bidding. Hence for this research the Pareto Optimal Points obtained from the 
above analysis are considered acceptable.  
The points A, B, C and D highlighted in the graph can be used by decision-makers to 
select their strategy. For example, if the public sector can allocate about $1606M on the 
project, then they must use the solution related to point C. Adopting this approach would 










































hand, if the public sector can spend about $1603M, then it is advisable for the public 
sector to adopt the strategy corresponding to points A or B. Notice, that by adopting point 
A, the public sector costs would be lesser than the costs associated with point B. 
However, it must also be realized that by selecting point A instead of point B, the 
financial variation for the private sector is increasing very rapidly. Hence, the public 
sector must select the results carefully and consider the tradeoffs associated with each 
strategy.  
4.4.3 Effect of Different Distribution on Results 
As per the discussion in Section 4.2.1.2, the deductions were assumed to follow 
triangular distribution. The parameters assumed for the analysis are: 
Lower limit of deductions = a = 0 
Upper limit of deductions = b = 1.66 
Mode = (a+b)/2 = 0.83 
The mode is assumed to be located at the center of its range with the intent to avoid 
making assumptions about the deductions, which seems to be correlated with the private 
sector’s overall efficiency (as discussed in Section 4.2.1.2). With these parameters, the 
analysis as explained in Section 4.3 was carried out. Since the expected value of 
deduction following discrete uniform distribution and the mode of deductions following 
triangular distribution would result in no difference in the MODDP results. This implies 
that in this case also the Design MAP would be $34.597M. However, when the analysis 
was carried out using the MOSDP and MObDP models following results were obtained:  
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Table 10 Effect of Deduction’s Distribution on MAPs 
Models Uniform Distribution Triangular Distribution 
MODDP $34.597 $34.597M 
MOSDP $34.73M $34.73M 
MObDP $34.6448M $34.650M 
Comparison shows that, the MAPs designed using MOSDP are giving same values and 
the MAPs designed using the MObDP models have negligible difference when 
considering uniform and triangular distribution. If the values are rounded up to the 
second decimal, we get the same value.   
Since the results obtained till now (referring to tables 7 through 10 and figures 15 through 
17) shows that the result patterns obtained from MOSDP model shows very high 
resemblance to the MODDP results while falling between the extremes of deterministic 
and simulated models, it was decided that for rest of the research work only the MODDP 
model and the MObDP models would be used.    
4.4.4 Model Performance 
The calculations provided untill now considered only the backward-pass calculations 
(covering steps 1 to 6 listed in Winston, 2004, and discussed in Section 3.6). As per step 
7, the results obtained can now be used to move forward from first stage to second stage 
and similarly all the way up to the final stage. While moving from one stage to the other, 
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realization takes place (about private sector’s performance and also the deductions) and 
we might find that the project is at a state that was not expected at the beginning. Now, 
since the project is at a different state, we do the following: 
a)  establish the state at the current stage, and 
b) use the model results already available to us to identify the best strategy (in terms 
of MAPs) for the remaining concession term. 
These two steps when applied through all the stages (moving from first stage to last 
stage) will allow us know how the project will end if we use the results from this model. 
In this part since we move from first stage to the final stage, the process is called a 
realization pass. To accomplish this, macros were developed and the model was run 
iteratively.   
The models were run10,000 times giving us 10,000 optimal solutions. Each run consisted 
of a backward-pass followed by a realization pass. The models’ backward-pass remained 
the same as descried earlier and the realization pass always used random values of 
deductions.  
Why Include a Realization Pass in Decision-Making?  
The MAP designed by using the backward-pass is sufficient and can be used directly on 
the project. But, it would be more beneficial if we enhance our designs by incorporating 
the “intelligence” regarding: 
1.  how good will be to use the designed MAP, and 
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2.  how the solution (obtained through backward-pass) guide the decision-makers to 
change the MAPs.   
For example, let us assume that the Design MAP is $32M and the project is in the O&M 
phase. The designed MAP can be a perfect design or it can be an imperfect design. If the 
MAP of $32M proves to be a perfect design (a hypothetical case), the realization pass 
would not have any change in MAPs. However, if $32M is an imperfect design, the 
solution obtained through the backward-pass would help the decision-makers change the 
MAP during each stage. Thus, if we refine our design MAPs by incorporating all the 
intelligence gathered from the realization pass, then our results are expected to get better. 
The analysis of 10,000 iterations consisting of a backward-pass followed by a realization 
pass shows that: 
MAP from MODDP models = $34.676M 
MAP from MObDP model = $34.689M 
These values were obtained using the calculation procedure described in Section 4.4. The 
following table summarizes the difference between the two sets of results. 
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Table 11 Comparison of MAPs On The Basis of Passes 
 Backward-pass 
(Uniform Distribution) 
Backward & Realization Pass 
(Uniform Distribution) 
Design MAP using MODDP $34.597 $34.676M 
Design MAP using MObDP $34.6448M $34.689M 
The results show that the MAPs designed using backward and realization passes are 
higher. It is believed here that as the model was run in a forward direction the model 
could also capture the variation in decisions occurring during the O&M phase. Thus, it is 
believed that, although the values obtained through both backward and realization pass 
calculations are higher they would offset the risk of very high changes in MAPs.  
4.4.5 Validation of Results 
The method used above provides some results, but: How good can these results be? This 
requires that the approach developed above is validated. In order to do so, additional 
information about the Presidio Parkway project was collected. The information included 
details about the finalized agreement between Presidio Parkway Project Authority 
(Caltrans) and Golden Link Partners (a company collectively formed by HOCHTIEF PPP 
Solutions North America Inc., MINA USA, LLC, Flatiron West, Inc., Kiewit 
Infrastructure West Co., Scotia Capital Inc., Milbank, Tweed, Hadley & McCloy LLP, 
Orrick Herrington & Sutcliffe LLP, LeighFisher, TSIB, Moore McNeil, 
Barclays Capital Inc., Merrill Lynch, Pierce Fenner & Smith Incorporated and Scotia 
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Capital, Inc.). The finalized agreement document reveals that GLP approached various 
institutions, with the objective of defining an optimal financial structure for the project 
and developed a financial structure that ensured a timely debt procurement and financial 
close. Furthermore, the final documents reveal that the GLP transferred its construction 
responsibility to Flatiron and Kiewit through a fixed price, date-certain design-build 
contract. The documents show that this would cost GLP an amount of $254.03M, which 
is just above half of the $501M expected before the bidding. In addition, it was also 
observed that the optimal financial structure developed by GLP would cost them a total 
of about $358M during the construction phase, which is a little more than half of $629M 
(which includes 501 Construction Costs, $97M for repayment of senior debt, $25M for 
interests and $6M for fees and other costs), the cost estimated before bidding. These 
differences in the capital expenses and the optimal structuring of finances would lead to 
significant savings to GLP. Hence, the model used for base case analysis was revisited 
and the models were modified to represent project with reduced capital costs.  
Models were developed by reducing the construction costs to 50% and 60% and 
correspondingly the debts (senior and junior) were also reduced. The operating costs, 
maintenance and rehabilitation costs and the taxes were not changed. This gave us three 
different models. The models with 50% and 60% costs were the closest to what GLP 
proposed GLP (since the construction costs and the total funds required during 
construction were between the 50% and 60% range of the costs expected during bidding).  
These models were run 97 times and following results were obtained.  
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Table 12 Results with Reduced Capital Costs 





MAP (MODDP) $27.56M $28.97M 
$28.55M 
MAP (MObDP) $27.51M $29.06M 
It is evident from the above results that the values obtained from the models are very 
close to the actual MAPs offered by GLP, which is $28.55M. The results obtained above 
validate the model and thus can be used to design MAPs with very limited information. It 
must also be noted here that the values obtained from the models are based on the 
information available before the concessionaire is known. Hence, it is expected that the 
model might be able to provide much better results if the model is run after obtaining 
precise information about the concessionaire.   
4.5 Summary of the Chapter 
This chapter uses Caltrans’ Presidio Parkway Project as a case study and demonstrates 
the use of the hybrid models to design MAPs. The analysis was carried out using 
expected values as well as randomly generated values of deductions. Comparison of the 
results shows that the designed MAPs were higher when randomly generated values of 
deduction were used. In addition, the results also show that the discrete uniform 
distribution and triangular distribution had a negligible effect on MAP design. Last, the 
chapter also shows how to design the MAPs using the “intelligence” gathered from the 
project’s performance when using the solutions from backward-pass calculations. The 
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approach was called realization pass. The MAPs designed using backward and realization 
pass iterations were found to be conservative and are expected to be safer than then 
results obtained from backward-pass only.  
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Chapter5. Design of Concession Period 
5.1 Introduction 
In the previous chapters, a fixed, 30-years’ Operations and Maintenance concession 
period was considered. It is a general practice to fix the concession period early in the 
project on the basis of heuristics and then carry out analysis for feasibility (analyses like 
Value for Money (VFM)). The contemporary analyses do not consider estimating the 
advantages/disadvantages of varying the concession term (HM Treasury, 2006 and 
Partnerships Victoria, 2001). This chapter of the dissertation specifically focuses on 
variation of concession length (while keeping all other parameters fixed) and puts 
forward an approach that will help to determine the most economical concession period. 
This analysis will enable the public sector to determine the duration of concession 
periods. It is very important to design the concession period since each year of 
concession allows the private sector to retain control over the asset and enjoy several 
privileges which can go against the public interests. In case of availability payments, 
during each year the private sector gets paid by the public sector for maintaining the 
availability of the highway. Hence if the concession term is larger than or shorter than 
necessary the risk of private sector’s making exceptionally high profit through public 
funds or private sector’s failure increases respectively. In either case, it is a loss to the 
public. Hence it is very important to consider concession term as an important parameter 
in all the PPP analysis. This chapter is dedicated towards design of concession term. The 
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analysis uses the model described in the previous chapter and establishes a method that 
will enable the public sector to determine the most economical concession term along 
with the determination of optimal MAP. 
5.2 Importance of Considering Variation of Concession Term During Analysis 
Highways require regular as well as periodic maintenance. The regular maintenance 
activities are required very frequently, consume very short time spans and are relatively 
cheaper. On the other hand the periodic maintenance activities are required at 
predetermined intervals and are very expensive. The interval between two periodic 
maintenance activities depends on factors such as preventive maintenance of highways, 
pavement type, climatic condition, highway use and several others. Since the periodic 
maintenance costs are very expensive the inclusion or exclusion of these costs can make a 
significant impact on the overall highway life cycle costs. Observe the Figure 18 adopted 
from Li & Kaini (2007). The figure shows periodic maintenance costs over the lifecycle 
of a highway. The figure shows that as the years pass, the Pavement Condition Index 
(representing the condition of the pavement) decreases. The pavement condition 
improves significantly when periodic maintenance activities are carried out. The 
deterioration and maintenance cycles continue several times and represent the life cycle 
of the highway. Generally the life cycle of highways is larger than concession terms in 
PPPs with Availability Payment mechanism. In these conditions, it is necessary to 
determine the duration of concession term since the inclusion or exclusion of a periodic 








Consider that the concession term of a PPP ends a few years before the first major 
rehabilitation (Concession Term 1 in Figure 18). As a result the public sector owns the 
responsibility to rehabilitate the highway immediately after the transfer of the highway. 
However, if the concession term ends a few years after the first major rehabilitation  
(Concession Term 2 in Figure 18) the public sector gets a newly rehabilitated highway 
after the transfer. It is reasonable to assume here that the experience gained by the private 
sector towards maintaining the highway throughout the concession period may make the 
private sector more efficient to carry out the rehabilitation which could reduce the overall 
costs of the highway. This could prove to be a win-win condition for the public sector as 
well as the private sector since the private sector gets an opportunity to use its experience 
and establishment to carry out additional work at a higher efficiency and the “public 
sector” reduces the overall inhouse costs (which may prove much higher than private 
sector due to lack of experience and lesser efficiency) and risks associated with 
rehabilitation. In these conditions it is beneficial to increasing the concession term. 
However, longer concession duration empowers the private sector to control the asset for 
longer duration which could go against the public interests. Furthermore, each additional 
year of concession would make the private sector eligible to Operate and Maintain the 
highway and upon satisfactory performance, entitle them to receive Availability 
Payments. In such conditions it is necessary to design concession term appropriately.  
Furthermore, it is evident from the figure adopted from Li & Kaini 2007  that before the 
two major rehabilitation jobs the highway passes through several preventive as well as 
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corrective maintenance jobs. The preventive and corrective maintenance keep the 
highway in good condition and help in delaying the rehabilitation of pavement. The delay 
helps in reducing the overall highway live cycle costs due to the Time Value of Money 
effect.  Although having preventive maintenance program in place is beneficial, the 
DOTs are sometimes forced to avoid preventive maintenance due to financial constraints. 
This reduces DOTs’ maintenance costs but accelerates pavement deterioration forcing the 
DOTs to rehabilitate the highway earlier.  In these circumstances it is better to pass on the 
operation and maintenance responsibility to the private sector that would be willing to 
invest money towards preventive maintenance resulting in better highway condition. 
When the highways are maintained well the investment intensive rehabilitation can be 
delayed which contributes towards overall reduction of life cycle costs. Hence it can be 
beneficial to increase the concession term.  However, since each additional year of 
concession can prove costly to the public it is necessary to design the concession term 
using appropriate tools.  
5.3 Analysis to Determine The Most Economical Concession Term 
In order to select the most economical concession term the Multi-Objective Stochastic 
Dynamic Model framework described in Section 3.2 was used again. The analysis was 
carried out through the following steps: 
1. Determining the maintenance costs for the highway. 
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2. Models were set up to have concession terms less than 30-years as well as more 
than 30-years.  
3. In each model, appropriate arrangements were made for randomly generated 
Deductions to follow Discrete Uniform Distribution.  
4. The model was run 1000 times and during each run (Backward-Pass and then 
Realization Pass) simulated values of deductions were used.  
5. Highway lifecycle costs were estimated. The lifecycle costs fully enclosed the 
PPP concession term.  
6. Lifecycle costs for projects with different concession terms were compared which 
enabled the identification of concession term costing least.   
7. Using the identified concession term use the value of optimal MAP (determined 
in steps 2 and 3) and use the combination of identified concession term and 
Optimal MAP bidding and/or negotiating.  
Notice that in steps 3 and 4 the models with different concession periods are run. These 
steps are just the repetition of steps described in Sections 4.3.2 and 4.3.3. The results 
obtained in steps 3 and 4 are compared to identify the best alternative. In the whole 
process, only the setting up of the models and comparison of results differs. Hence the 
following part of this section explains the process of setting up of models with different 
concession terms (Step1 and 2), comparison of results and selection of the best alternative 
(Steps 4 through 6). Following part of this section continues with the case study and 
provides details for setting up these models.  
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5.4 Determining the Maintenance Costs 
In case of Presidio Parkway Project the high periodic maintenance costs are expected to 
occur at regular intervals. The cost profile is shown in figure 19. The figure shows that 
the maintenance costs are forming peaks due to periodic maintenance and major 
rehabilitation activities but remain at very low levels for routine maintenance activities. 
 
Figure 19 Periodic Maintenance Costs for Presidio Parkway Project 
Under DBFOM PPP the public sector’s maintenance responsibility would start in 2043. 
As per the DBFOM plan the private sector would be responsible for preventive 
maintenance also which would push the investment intensive highway rehabilitation to 
years 2072 and 2073. On the other hand when other options such as DBB or DBF are 
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and maintaining the highway. Since the public sector (CALTRANS) expects financial 
challenges the Preventive Maintenance is ignored under these project delivery options 
which accelerates the pavement deterioration and forces the public sector to perform the 
investment intensive maintenance activities much earlier. The costs associated with these 
two PPP options can be seen in Figure 19. However, for clarity and to avoid overlapping 
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In the current condition the DBFOM PPP with concession of 30-years can be shown 
graphically as shown in Figure 20. The figure shows that as the concession term ends 
after 30-years (in the year 2043) the public sector becomes responsible for the post-
concession maintenance. The costs associated with the post concession maintenance are 
shown in the figure. Similarly, when concession terms greater than 30-years are 
considered for analysis the public sector would start operating and maintaining the 
highway straightaway after the concession ends. This can be observed visually from the  
Figure 21. 
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Notice that if the concession period is increased by 5-years several small and high peaks 
(representing small and high maintenance costs respectively) can be avoided. On the 
other hand if the concession term is reduced the maintenance costs must begin 
immediately after the concession. For this analysis we considered concession period of 
25-years which required combining the operating and maintenance costs from years 25 to 
30 with the operating and maintenance costs beyond 30-years. For a better understanding 
this has been shown graphically in Figure 22. 
 
Figure 22 Post Maintenance Costs (derived) For 25 Year Concession Period 
 When the costs were obtained and grouped as shown in the above figures (Figures 20, 21 
































Table 13 Post Concession Operation, Rehabilitation and Maintenance Costs ($M) 
Description Post Concession Operation, Rehabilitation 
and Maintenance Costs ($M) 
25 Concession Years 644 
30 Concession Years 591 (Given) 
35 Concession Years 572 
40 Concession Years 513 
45 Concession Years 486 
50 Concession Years 424 
These post concession costs were used in our model as the fifth parameter of the model 
(as described in Section 4.2.9) 
5.5 Setting Up Models With Different Concession Terms 
The Multi-Objective Stochastic Dynamic Programming Model developed and used in this 
research work uses the Stochastic Dynamic Programming model framework with a 
Multi-Objective objective function. Hence the model is very much dependent on the 
Stages (years) and States (Private Sector’s Financial State) of the project. On the other 
hand, the Stages and States are dependent on the concession term and must be changed 
according to the changes in concession period. Hence we must establish relationships 
between Stages and States for each concession term which requires us to develop equity 
cash flow statements (ECFS). While developing ECFS the overall process remains the 
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same (as explained in Section 4.2.3) but the changes occur in the financial structure 
(especially repayment of bonds) due to increase or decrease of concession term. When 
the concession term is increased, the TIFIA repayment can be spread out to cover the 
concession term resulting in low payments throughout the concession terms resulting in 
higher NPV to the private sector. On the other hand if the concession term is decreased 
the TIFIA must be repaid within a shorter period of time which increases the amount of 
annual payments. This increases the annual cash outflows for the private sector resulting 
in reduced NPV. The effects from these changes are very much evident from figure 23 
where all the cumulative cash flows for all the concession terms are compared.  
Visually comparing the 20-years and 50-years graphs show that the overall models differ 
significantly. Also notice that the durations of both the cases are different creating overall 
differences in ECFSs. It must be noted here that the model uses the same annual costs for 
Operations as well as for Maintenance and Rehabilitation. These costs are same since 
these activities do not vary with the variation of concession term. For example, for a 
highway with concrete pavement the costs of Operation as well as Maintenance and 
Rehabilitation will remain unchanged for the private sector if the project is having a 
concession term of 25-years or 50-years.  
The last thing that required due attention was including appropriate Tax Adjustments in 
ECFSs. The information about annual Tax Adjustments for 30-years as well as NPV of 
Tax Adjustments ($36M in the year 2009) was available from project documents. It was 
necessary to decide whether to use annual Tax Adjustment values or to use values 
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derived from NPV of $36M (for the year 2009). It was noticed that if the actual yearly 
Tax Adjustments are used for analysis of 25 and 30-years’ concession term then it would 
be necessary to use actual Tax Adjustments values to maintain consistency in analysis of 
concession terms more than 30-years. However, since the Tax Adjustment values beyond 
30-years were not available from the project documents it was considered appropriate to 
use uniform payments derived from the NPV of Tax Adjustments for each and every 
analysis.  
Similar process was adopted to develop ECFS for 35, 40, 45 and 50 years. In these ECFs 
the post-concession maintenance costs were shortened by 5, 10, 15 and 20 years 
respectively and the availability payments were lengthened by the same number of years. 
Thus we could obtain ECFS for 25, 35, 40, 45 and 50 years. The ECFs were used to 
calculate NPV from the project. This enabled us to estimate the allowable annual 
deductions that would allow the private sector to have an IRR of 11.5%.  
Cumulative values of ECF were obtained which represented the Financial Upper Bound 
of the project.  When the acceptable annual Deductions were applied to the ECFS the 
cumulative ECF gave the Financial Lower Bound of the project. All the Financial Upper 
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It is evident from figure 23 that as the concession term (Stages) changes the Financial 
States (States) also changes. Furthermore, visual comparisons of allowable Financial 
States for projects with shorter and longer concession terms (say 25-years and 50-years) 
have significant differences. The differences are observed in the area enclosed by the 
financial bounds and range of Financial Status.  
When projects have shorter concession terms the private sector will have to repay the 
TIFIA in a relatively shorter period of time. This increases annual TIFIA payment 
amounts and shrinks the values of ECFs. As a result the private sector’s rate of return 
reduces indicating that the private sector has a very limited scope of earning above its 
MARR. In such conditions the private sector will only be able to bear very small 
deductions and if the deductions are higher, the private sector’s rate of return might fall 
below the their MARR. Hence the Upper and Lower Financial Bounds are much closer 
when the concession term is shorter. [Note: When concession term was set to 20-years 
the NPV of ECFs was falling below the assumed MARR of 11.5%. Hence this option 
was not considered for analysis]  
On the other hand when the concession term is higher the private sector has a very long-
term to repay TIFIA which reduces the annual payment amounts. As a result the rate of 
return gets higher which allows the private sector to earn more. In these conditions the 
private sector can afford to have larger deductions and still manage to satisfy MARR. 
This is evident from figure 23. Notice that when the concession term is set to 50 years the 
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Financial Bounds are much apart indicating that the Private sector has a much broader 
range to earn.     
The other difference was observed in the range of Financial Status. When the concession 
term was short the private sector had a shorter duration to perform and receive 
Availability Payments but when the concession term was long the private sector had 
longer duration to perform and receive Availability Payments. This difference is visible 
from the difference of range of Financial Status between the different graphs.  
These differences were incorporated in the model and thus a model for each concession 
term was obtained. These models were run for 1000 iterations considering  
1. Expected Deductions during backward-pass and random deduction during 
realization pass and 
2. Random Deductions during backward-pass and random deduction during 
Realization Pass. 
The analysis from the model output allowed calculating the overall life cycle cost of the 
PPP project with different concession term.  
5.6 Results 
The model was run 1000 times which gave us the frequency of occurrence of each MAP 
in the optimal solution. Using the number of occurrence as weights the average MAP for 
each concession term was obtained. This process was adopted for models using Expected 
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Values in backward-pass as well as the models using random values in backward-pass. 
The results obtained from the analysis are shown in the following table.   
Table 14 Comparison Of Results (MAPs)  
Description Average Design MAP ($M) 
MODDP Model MObDP Model 
25 Concession Years 35.3562 35.3566 
30 Concession Years 34.676 34.698 
35 Concession Years 33.099 33.121 
40 Concession Years 31.7388 31.7478 
45 Concession Years 30.5457 30.6129 
50 Concession Years 29.8912 29.9029 
It is evident from the above table that as the concession term is increasing the average 
MAPs are decreasing. These decreased values of MAPs compensate towards the 
increased concession term and optimally satisfies the public and private sector objectives. 
As per the results, if the public sector can afford $29.9M as MAPs they must consider a 
concession term of 50-years. On the other hand if the public sector can afford MAPs up 
to $35.356M they can consider awarding concession period of 25-years. The results can 





Figure 24 Availability Payment Design for Presidio Parkway Project 
Thus, using the above model the private sector can design MAPs and concession duration 
simultaneously. The solutions obtained from this research ensure that while the private 
sector realizes its MARR, the public sector’s objective of reducing the public sector costs 
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Chapter 6 Availability Payment Design – Analysis of Factors and Parameters 
6.1 Factors Affecting Availability Payment PPP Designs  
In the previous chapters, MAPs and concession durations were designed for the Presidio 
Parkway Project using the hybrid models. The model is capable of integrating concessionaire’s 
several characteristics in the design. The model can thus be used to design contracts suitable for 
concessionaires with different characteristics.  This makes the hybrid model highly sophisticated 
and can provide us valuable insights about Availability Payment PPP designs under uncertainty 
and variations of several important factors. For example, before bidding, the concessionaire is 
unknown and hence it is safer to expect a mediocre performance during the concession term. The 
mediocre performance could lead to very high deductions, increasing the risk of a concessionaire 
abandoning the project. The MObDP model can be set to take deductions corresponding to 
mediocre performance (as well as for good performance) as inputs and design of a conservative 
MAP. This approach would help the public sector hedge the risks from the event where a 
concessionaire gets into a partnership but cannot deliver the services as expected, thus getting 
heavily penalized and eventually abandoning the partnership. On the other hand, after bidding, 
the concessionaire is known to the public sector and it can use the bid documents to estimate 
concessionaire’s performance and design suitable MAPs. Furthermore, due to uncertainty, the 
factors that influence may not remain same throughout the concession term. This could also lead 
to situations that would not be in public and private sector interests. Hence, this current chapter is 
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devoted to identifying the factors that can influence the overall design as well as determine the 
extent to which these factors influence the design of Availability Payment PPPs. 
The factors considered for analysis are: 
1. Private sector’s performance risks   
2. Private sector’s risk aptitude – case of optimistic and risk-taking private sector  
3. Private sector’s efficiency during construction 
4. Improvement in private sector’s O&M efficiency.  
6.2 Effect of Private Sector’s Performance Risks on MAPs 
Availability Payment PPPs are long-term contracts usually spanning 20 to 30 years. During these 
years the concessionaire performs its duties (i.e., keep the highways available for use) and in 
return gets annually reimbursed through predetermined Availability Payments. The 
reimbursement is 100% for full availability of the highway lanes, but if the highway is closed 
due to any reason, the penalties are imposed and the payments are reduced accordingly. The 
deductions (from penalties) are not only dependent on concessionaire’s performance efficiency 
but they are also dependent on all the uncertainties associated with long-term projects.   
 For a highly efficient private sector, these deductions can be expected to be much less, but if 
unexpected uncertain events occur (for example, the concessionaire’s subcontractor is forced to 
file bankruptcy and abandons the project or the region faces unexpectedly high fog in the region 
due to environmental imbalance along the alignment of the highway), then there are all chances 
that the concessionaire could face heavy penalties. The situation would be much grimmer for the 
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concessionaire with mediocre performance efficiency. Under these uncertain conditions, it is 
necessary that the MAPs are designed to protect the project from concessionaire’s performance 
uncertainties.  
The control points (discussed in Sections 3.5 and 4.2.1.3) enable us to integrate the 
concessionaire’s performance under uncertainty into our analysis.  Let us assume that a 
concessionaire is evaluated on the basis of five different attributes. These attributes can be 
selected by the public sector to identify the best suitable concessionaire for a given project: for 
example, attributes like cost overruns, schedule slippage, accidents, experience in operating and 
maintaining highways, number of permanent employees with relevant experience, financial 
stability, financial liquidity or any other similar attribute. Once these attributes are obtained (or 
estimated) for the concessionaire, the public sector can establish a control point corresponding to 
the concessionaire’s overall attribute score. For example if the concessionaire gets a combined 
attribute score of 90%, then we can put the control points at 10% from the lower financial 
boundary (discussed in Section 3.6) towards the upper financial boundary indicating that the 
concessionaire would only require a 10% increase beyond the lower financial boundary to 
manage the project. Similarly, if the private sector gets a combined attribute score of 70%, then 
the control points can be located at 30% from the lower financial boundary. Thus, we can say 
that if the efficiency is expected to be high, then the control point can be set near the lower 
boundary and thus these control points can be very effectively used to represent concessionaire’s 
performance efficiency.   
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Once the control points are obtained and set up in the model, the model would use them to 
achieve desired financial levels for the concessionaire. The control points for an efficient 
concessionaire would be set near the lower financial boundary and direct the model to measure 
the financial variation from near the lower bound (since the control points are set near the lower 
boundary). Hence, the designed MAPs would be very low. On the other hand, if the private 
sector efficiency is expected to be low, the control points would be obtained towards the upper 
boundary (discussed in Section 3.6), which would enable the models to reduce the costs but since 
the control points would be towards the upper boundary, the resulting MAPs could be higher. 
Thus, the position of control points can help to design MAPs suitable for a particular 
concessionaire. Once these specific design MAPs are obtained, the public sector can use them 
during negotiation with the concessionaire. In this section, we focus on determining MAPs that 
could be used during negotiations while not knowing about private sector’s O&M efficiency.  
To accomplish this task, control points were set up to reflect the private sector’s O&M 
Efficiency.  As discussed above, the control points were set up near the lower boundary when the 
private sector’s O&M efficiency was expected to be higher. By joining all such control points, 
we obtained a boundary, which has been named the control bound. Similarly, control bounds 
were also obtained that would represent concessionaires with different O&M efficiency. Notice 
that in Figure 25, several bounds were setup between the upper and lower financial bounds, each 
representing a concessionaire with a different O&M efficiency. Thus, after this analysis we 
would be able to design MAPs that can be used for negotiations with concessionaires with some 
level of efficiency.      
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Figure 25 shows the control bounds used during the analysis. In this analysis, it was assumed that 
the private parties that would qualify for the partnership would have excellent, extremely good, 
very good, good, above average or at least average O&M efficiencies. For each of these 
efficiencies, specific control points were obtained and used to design MAPs. For excellent O&M 
efficiency, the control points were set up as the lower bound itself; for average O&M efficiency, 
the control points were set up as the upper bound itself. Control points for all other efficiencies 
were set up between the upper and lower limit. 
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The base case analysis assumed that the concessionaire would have very good efficiency, and 
hence the control points were set up between the upper and lower boundaries in the lower one-
fourth region. Similarly, the control points for concessionaires with very good, good and above 
average O&M efficiencies were set up between the half and three-fourth region; one-fourth and 
half region; and upper one-fourth region, respectively. The model was to be run 97 times with 
randomly generated deductions to ensure 95% confidence interval within 10% error (Appendix 
12). However, for this analysis the model was run 1,000 times and following results were 
obtained.  
Table 15 Comparison of Designed MAPs 
Description Average Design MAP ($M) 
MODDP Model MObDP Model 
Control Bound as Upper Bound 34.703 34.747 
Control Bound Between Upper Bound and 25% 34.719 34.7315 
Control Bound Between 25% and 50% 34.709 34.725 
Control Bound Between 50% and 75% 34.7018 34.719 
Control Bound as Lower Bound 34.645 34.644 
Base Case 34.676 34.689 
Table 15 shows that when the private sector was expected to perform at extremely high 
efficiencies (i.e., control points were set on the lower boundary) the MAPs could be reduced 
from $35.53M to $34.644M, a reduction of 2.494% in MAPs. On the other hand, if the private 
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sector’s O&M efficiency is totally unknown, the public sector can still reduce the MAPs from 
$35.53M to $34.747M, which converts to a 2.204% reduction in MAPs. In terms of position of 
control point, notice that designed MAP values decrease as the control points move nearer to the 
lower boundary. The control points near the lower boundary represent higher efficiency. It can 
be observed that a 1% change in the position of control bound could change the MAPs by 
$0.0089M. 
 
Figure 26 Variation of MAPs with Variation in Control Bounds 
It can be observed that both the plots follow a decreasing trend. The decreasing trend reflects the 
effect of control points (i.e., private sector’s O&M efficiency) on the overall decision (MAPs) as 
expected.  
y = -0.007x + 0.0298
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Summary statistics (from Table 14) reveal that when MODDP is used during the backward-pass, 
the average design MAP is $34.692M, and when MObDP is used during backward as well as 
realization passes, the average design MAP is $34.709 M. The standard deviations are 0.027 and 
0.037, respectively.  
6.3 Discussion - Effect of Private Sector’s Performance Risks on MAPs 
The control points described in the preceding section leads us to negotiable MAPs when the 
private sector’s O&M efficiency might be unknown. When the public sector knows that the 
private sector would be very efficient, it can design an aggressively smaller MAP by setting 
control points closer to the lower financial boundary. Similarly, if the O&M efficiency is 
unknown, control points can be up accordingly to design MAPs. It is evident from Figure 26 that 
as the private sector performance uncertainty decreases, the Design MAPs also reduces. The 
trend-line for the graph shows a relationship between public sector’s desire to reduce costs and 
Design MAPs. Thus, we can conclude here that control points influence MAP designs and can 
help the public sector reduce the overall cost of the project. Also, notice that since the MOSDP 
model is developed as a multi-objective optimization model, the objective that provides stability 
to the private sector’s financial state (project finance) does not allow extreme reduction of 
MAPs, thus reducing private sector’s risks of financial failure. 
As the use of performance-based PPPs is expected to increase (Parker, 2011) using the MODDP 
and MObDP models with appropriately set control points can be extremely useful. For example, 
in case of the Presidio Parkway Project, the private sector will be responsible for several tasks 
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including operating and maintaining the tunnel systems as well as intelligent transportation 
systems (ITS) and communications. These tasks are highly specialized and might not be the 
strengths of the private sector. In such cases, the control points can be set to reflect the private 
sector’s weaknesses and the Design MAPs will be higher than expected. This will happen since 
the models would read the private sector’s weaknesses from the control points and would design 
MAPs that would enable the private sector cope with the reduced MAPs in case of defaults. If 
these Design MAPs turn out to be very big, the public sector can consider retaining the 
responsibilities with itself.  
Thus, the public sector can very effectively use the MODDP and MObDP models with 
appropriately set control points to design Availability Payment PPPs. This would help them to 
achieve the DOT’s long-term performance goals. Although the analysis of Presidio Parkway 
Project shows that the designs would be influenced by private sector’s performance efficiency, 
the effect was not significant. 
6.4 Private Sector’s Risk Aptitude 
The private sector is known for their risk-taking characteristics. It is not difficult to find a private 
party that would continue working on a project even after earning returns less than the expected 
returns. This approach is very likely for long-term projects like PPPs. It is assumed here that the 
private sector experiences losses and as a result the private sector would earn less than its 
MARR. Graphically, we can say that the private sector finds its financial state below the lower 
financial boundary (Figure 5) indicating that the private sector gets returns below its MARR 
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level. In a strict sense, the private sector must quit but the private sector’s risk-taking attitude 
may enable it to continue as a partner.  
The risk-taking behavior of a private party would keep it motivated to continue on less profitable 
projects. A private party with a relatively higher risk-taking attitude would always be motivated 
to work on projects yielding relatively lower MARR when compared to private parties with 
relatively lower risk-taking attitude.  If such a high risk-taking private party is expected to win 
the bid, the public sector can capitalize on private sector’s risk-taking behavior. In this section, 
we use the MODDP and MObDP model to enable the public sector to design MAPs, depending 
on private sector’s risk aptitude.  
This scenario was modeled by using the method discussed in Chapter 3 and 4. The only 
modification to the model is in its additional bound, which has been named as the Optimistic 
Bound. This bound was developed by assuming that the private sector would continue working 
as a partner even if the actual MARR falls down below the expected MARR. The scenarios 
assumed that the private sector realizes returns at 8%, 9%, 10%, 11%, 12% and 13%. Figure 27 
shows (from top to bottom) the upper financial bound (i.e., public sector interests); dotted control 
points for 11.5% (i.e., representative of private sector performance) and dotted lower boundary 
for 11.5% (representing private sector interests); and control points for 10% return and lower 




Figure 27 Bounds Representing Optimistic Private Sector 
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Table 16 Comparison of Designed MAPs 
Private IRR Average Design MAP ($M) 
MODDP Model  MObDP Model 
8% 33.449 33.472 
9% 33.778 33.745 
10% 34.132 34.164 
11% 34.531 34.516 
11.5% (Base case) 34.676 34.689 
12% 34.851 34.834 
13% 35.233 35.243 
Plotting these values in a graph (Figure 28) we observe that the rate of return is negatively 
correlated with Design MAPs. We can also observe that as the risk-taking aptitude increases (i.e., 
acceptable rate of return is decreasing), the design MAPs decrease. Analysis shows that for a 1% 





Figure 28 Relation between Private Sector’s Risk Aptitude (MARR) and MAPs 
6.5 Discussion - Private sector’s risk aptitude 
This scenario represents a case where a private party is willing to continue in a PPP project even 
though it experiences some losses. In strict terms, the private party must quit; however, in certain 
conditions it may not quit. If the loss is realized during the initial years of operation, it is rational 
to expect the private party to be optimistic (due to its risk-taking approach) about recovery 
during the remaining years of operation. Conversely, if the loss is realized towards the end of 
concession, it is again rational to expect that the private party would still continue with the 
project for two reasons. First, the private party would want to finish the project just to avoid 
earning a reputation of quitters and, second, the time value of money would reduce significantly 
after 20-30 years. In either case, the private party would consider completing the project. Apart 























































risks (even by reducing profits) to learn and establish themselves in PPP markets. The analysis 
conducted in the previous section shows that if the private sector is known to be risk-taking, then 
the public sector can reduce MAPs.  
The MODDP and MObDP models have been used to design MAPs that would enable the public 
sector to reduce the overall expenses when the private sector is expected to absorb reduction in 
returns. This would enable the public sector to offer MAP limits that would be much smaller. 
Thus, this approach would enable the public sector to protect public interests.   
6.6 Private Sector’s Efficiency During Construction 
In the previous chapter, it was assumed that the private sector’s construction efficiency enabled 
them to earn 3% profit. However, the private party is not known until the bidding ends. Hence, 
the public sector does not know anything about the private sector’s construction efficiency. If a 
private party with high construction efficiency wins the bid, then they would be able to earn 
profits as expected (around 3%), but if the private party is less efficient, then the profit levels 
could reduce. This scenario focuses on the later situation and designs MAPs such that the risks 
from private sector’s unknown construction efficiency can be hedged off. This analysis is 
conducted by assuming that the ability of earning profits is directly correlated with the private 
party’s construction efficiency.  
Let us assume that the private sector’s efficiency is about half of what is required and thus 
manages to earn only 1.5% of $501M, thus reducing the profit by $7.515M. Due to this, the 
private sector enters the operation phase at a negative state of $42.485M instead of $35.716M. 
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Under these circumstances the private sector may abandon the PPP project, which could go 
against the overall objective of project. Hence, in such a condition, the public sector must adjust 
MAPs to ward off the risk of private party abandoning the project by allowing the private party 
to cope with the reduced profits. At the same time, the public sector must also protect the public 
interests by offering just appropriate amounts of MAPs. To enable the public sector to design 
such MAPs, the base case analysis was used again. The base case was used here so that a 





Figure 29 Bounds Representing Private Sector's Loss During Construction 
In the base case model, the lower bound represents the MARR bound. The private sector would 
abandon the project if its performance was substandard, leading to deductions. This would 
reduce their profits, and thus their financial status goes below the lowest bound (MARR bound). 
But, in the current scenario, we wish to design MAPs that would allow the private sector to 
cover-up the lost money. Hence, the model was set up with a new bound that was below the 
project’s MARR bound. This new bound gradually merges with the MARR bound at the end of 




























the MARR bound for the private sector and the lowest bound includes states that fall below the 
MARR level when the private sector experiences loss. It is evident from the graph that during the 
initial years of operations, there is a considerable difference between the two bounds. However, 
as the years pass by, the difference decreases and as the project reaches the end of concession 
period, the two bounds merge together. All other parameters of the model have been kept the 
same as they were in the base case. This would represent a scenario where the private sector’s 
efficiency was half. Similar scenarios were developed and the models were set up for 0%, 0.5%, 
1.0%, 1.5%, 2.0% and 2.5% profits apart from the base case scenario where the profit was set up 
to 3.0%.  
These models were run 97 times using values of expected deductions during the backward-pass 
and random deductions during the realization pass. The observations of iterations showed that 
when the efficiencies were less (i.e., the profit levels were less), the private sector’s financial 
condition fell below the lower boundary several times, which means that the private sector quit. 
For example, when the iterations were run for 1.5% profit scenario (using expected deductions 
during backward-pass), the 73rd iteration that did not complete as the financial state was below 
the lower boundary. Similarly, when values of randomly generated deductions were used during 
backward and realization pass the 19th and 23rd iterations did not complete. Similar observations 
were increasingly observed when iterations were carried out for profit levels less than 1.5%. The 
analysis was carried out for all the profit levels and following results were obtained:  
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Table 17 Design of MAP Values Considering Various Construction Efficiencies 
Profit in % of 
Construction Cost 
Average Design MAP ($M) 
MODDP Model MObDP Model 
0.0% 35.206 35.205 
0.5% 35.150 35.156 
1.0% 35.053 35.085 
1.5% 34.991 34.988 
2.0% 34.932 34.914 
2.5% 34.799 34.793 
3% (Base Case) 34.676 34.689 
The analysis shows that as the profit levels vary from 0% to 3%  the MAPs vary from $35.206M 
to $34.676M. Thus, we can say that for the Presidio Parkway Project, variation of profit by 1% 
would create a difference of $0.177M on MAPs.   
Also note that for the worst case scenario where the private sector does not make any money 
from construction activities, the public sector can offer limiting MAPs of $35.205M, which is 
$0.325M less than the limiting MAP of $35.53M offered for the Presidio Parkway Project. These 
savings adds up to $9.75M for the concession period of 30-years. On the other hand, if the 
private sector is expected to be very efficient and if the private sector can earn a profit of about 
3% (as expected), then the appropriate MAPs would be $34.689M, which is $0.841M less than 
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the limiting MAP of $35.53M. This would enable the public sector to save $25.23M during the 
whole concession period. 
6.7 Discussion About the Private Sector’s Efficiency During Construction 
The private sector’s construction efficiency can have a significant effect on MAP design. If the 
efficiency is high, they will perform well and thus meet all the contractual obligations. Such a 
situation would be an ideal situation where the private party would continue working on the 
project and this would also be beneficial for the public sector. However, the public sector does 
not know anything about the private sector’s construction efficiency when issuing project tender. 
If the limiting MAPs are higher than required, then it would prove to be costlier and thus against 
the public interests. Conversely, if the limiting MAPs are lower than necessary, the competition 
can be low and the private sector might abandon the project that would again go against the 
public interests. Hence, when issuing the tender, the limiting MAPs must be designed 
incorporating uncertainties in private sector’s construction efficiency.  
During the scenario analysis in the previous section it was assumed that a private party’s profit 
making capability is directly correlated with its construction efficiency. Higher construction 
efficiency would enable a private party to earn profits as per its expectations and vice versa. 
Hence, the variation of profit levels in the previous section represented a variation of the private 
sector’s construction efficiency. The results show that as the profit levels were reduced, the 
design MAP values increased. This implies that if the private sector’s construction efficiency is 
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expected to be less, then the MAPs must have higher values to ward off the risks of the private 
sector, abandoning the project midway.  
6.8 Improvement in Operation Efficiency  
PPPs are long-term projects. The length of the project allows the private sector to monitor and 
improve its performance over the length of the O&M phase. The improvement can lead to higher 
efficiency during the operations phase, leading to lower deductions. This scenario presents the 
analysis considering that the private sector improves continuously during the concession period 
leading to lower deductions towards the end of concession period and thus earning higher profits. 
The base-case model described in Chapter 4 was used here again for this scenario, where the 
deductions were assumed to be associated with private sector inefficiency. Deductions were 
assumed to follow discrete uniform distribution throughout the O&M phase. But, if the private 
sector improves its efficiency, then the deduction parameters would change during each stage. In 
order to estimate the deductions after improved performance, the concept of learning curves was 
used.  
Mathematically learning relationship can be expressed as (Mantel et al., 2007) 
Tn = T1•n
r
          (6.1) 
where,   Tn = Time required to complete the nth unit 
T1= Time required to complete the first unit and 
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r = Exponent of learning curve and can be calculated as 
r = log(learning rate)/log(2) 
The above learning curve relationship focuses on the time of completion of a task. It is known 
that when a task is repeated several times, the time required to complete the task would reduce. 
The above equation calculates the time required to complete the task nth time, considering that 
during each repetition, the efficiency to complete the task increases which in turn reduces the 
time. Along the same line, it has been assumed here that as the private sector continues to 
operate the asset, its O&M efficiency improves and gradually reduces the deductions. Since the 
two processes have similarities, the concept of the learning curve has been used to estimate 
deductions considering private party’s learning during the operation phase.  
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Table 18 Gradual Learning (10%) Leading To Decrease in Deductions 
Year Deduction Year Deduction Year Deduction Year Deduction 
2014 1.66456 2022 1.19193 2030 1.0821 2038 1.02049 
2015 1.49811 2023 1.173 2031 1.07274 2039 1.01442 
2016 1.40856 2024 1.15613 2032 1.06396 2040 1.00862 
2017 1.3483 2025 1.14094 2033 1.0557 2041 1.00306 
2018 1.30333 2026 1.12714 2034 1.0479 2042 0.99773 
2019 1.26771 2027 1.11451 2035 1.04051 2043 0.9926 
2020 1.23835 2028 1.10289 2036 1.03351 
2021 1.21347 2029 1.09212 2037 1.02684 
When formula (6.1) is applied to the project data considering a learning rate of 10%, we observe 
a gradual decrease in deductions. The gradual decrease in deductions can be observed from table 
17. Using the decreasing values of deduction, the base case model was run 97 times. Similar 
calculations were also carried out for 5%, 15% and 20%.. This gave us the following results.  
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Table 19 Comparison of Designed MAP Values 
Learning 
Average Design MAP ($M) 
MODDP Model MObDP Model 
0% (Base Case) 34.677 34.689 
5% 34.546 34.584 
10% 34.466 34.460 
15% 34.375 34.387 
20% 34.298 34.305 
It is evident from Table 18 that since the private sector is able to decrease the deductions the 
public sector can consider reducing the MAPs.  From the above results, we can say that a 1% 
increase in learning would allow the public sector to reduce the MAPs by $0.019M. 
6.9 Discussion - Improvement in Operation Efficiency 
The private sector is generally more resourceful and experienced than public sector in terms of 
construction, maintenance and operations of assets which enable them to control the project 
efficiently. This allows them to gradually improve the project performance and also to reduce 
deductions. Apart from this, the private sector is known to use various Project Maturity Models 
that help them improve their efficiencies on repetitive works. Furthermore, the private sector can 
get an advantage of economies of scale, enabling them to be more economical. Hence, it is 
reasonable to assume that the private sector will become more efficient with the passage of time. 
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This could mean that the private sector would be able to make profits more than expected and 
could lead to concerns from some sections of the society. To avoid this, the analysis in the 
previous section was focused on designing MAPs that could offset the extra profit earned 
towards the end of concession period.   
Analysis was conducted by gradually reducing the deductions by considering gradual 
improvement in the processes. The concept of the learning curve was used to estimate the 
gradual reduction in deductions. The analysis was conducted considering different learning rates 
that enabled estimating corresponding deductions. Analysis results show that as the deductions 
are decreasing (because of gradual improvement) the design values of MAPs are also decreasing. 
However, for this case study, it was observed that the effect of the private party’s gradual 
improvement has a limited effect on MAPs. In addition, if the Time Value of Money principles 
are applied, the overall savings from MAPs would shrink further. Hence, we conclude here that 
private sector’s improvement in O&M does not significantly affect the MAP design.   
6.10 Chapter Summary 
This chapter focuses on identification and quantification of factors that can affect the design of 
Availability Payment PPPs. Four factors were analyzed in this chapter viz: private sector’s 
performance uncertainty, private sector’s risk aptitude, private sector’s construction efficiency 
and gradual improvement in private sector’s O&M efficiency. The analysis shows that the 
private sector’s risk aptitude and the private sector’s construction efficiency are significantly 
affected the MAPs, while the private sector’s performance uncertainty and improvement in 
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Chapter 7 Summary and Conclusion 
7.1 Overall Summary 
The literature review of PPP practices around the world enabled identifying the problems in 
PPPs and defining the boundary of this research work. This work, for the first time, combines 
planning, construction, operations and maintenance and post-concession project costs in a single 
model for designing Availability Payments. This work thus helps in obtaining solutions 
considering the entire PPP project, rather than only one or two phases of the project.  
The model developed during this research is unique, since it aims to satisfy competing objectives 
simultaneously. The model designs MAPs that ensure public sector cost reduction as well as 
reduce a PPP project’s financial variation. The model also helps identify the most economical 
concession term. The analysis also helps to identify and measure the effect of various factors on 
the design of Availability Payment PPPs. 
7.2 Contribution to the Body of Knowledge 
This research work has four major contributions to the body of knowledge. 
1. The Design of Availability Payment PPPs 
This research work provides a method to design Availability Payment PPPs. Currently, the 
public sectors around the world do not have any tools to design Availability Payment PPPs. They 
largely rely on the private sector’s estimate of availability payments. The method developed in 
161 
 
this research work can be used to design MAPs as well as concession period. The method used in 
this research work provides designs leading to win-win conditions for the public and private 
parties, since the solutions ensure that the public sector costs are reduced and the financial 
variations are reduced simultaneously. This research work establishes a method that enables 
inclusion of uncertainties about the private sector into the designs, thus making the Availability 
Payment PPPs more stable and reliable. Thus, this research establishes a rigorous approach for 
designing PPPs that would ensure public interests.  
2. Identification and Quantification of Factors Affecting Designs 
This research puts forward an approach to identifying and quantifying the factors that can affect 
the Availability Payment designs. The factors analyzed during this research work were private 
sector’s performance, private sector’s risk aptitude, private sector’s construction efficiency and 
improvement in private sector’s O&M efficiency. Three amongst these four factors are related to 
private sector’s performance and hence this research work can be used to design performance-
based Availability Payment PPPs rather than designing finance based Availability Payment 
PPPs. Thus, this research work can help the public sectors achieve the long-term performance-
based objectives. 
3. A Model Capable of Integrating Various Project Phases in Design 
In this research work, a hybrid model was developed to design Availability Payment PPPs. The 
model was developed by combining a stochastic dynamic programming model with a  multi-
objective linear programming model. This model enables integration of: dynamic conditions 
arising during the concession term; performance uncertainties spread over the concession period; 
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and simultaneous consideration of public and private objectives as well as inclusion of post 
concession O&M costs. Thus, this research provides a model that can integrate several phases 
together and provide a design that would address all issues arising in these phases.  
4. Extended Use to Other Long-term PPP Projects 
The model developed and discussed in this research work basically uses inputs from projects’ 
equity cash flow statements. This makes the model more versatile for other performance-based 
long-term PPP projects. The model can be modified and used for designing PPP tenders and also 
for negotiations after bidding. For example, the model can be used to design shadow toll PPPs 
after replacement of deductions by traffic throughput and MAPs by shadow tolls.  
7.3 Limitations and Future Works 
The results obtained from the analysis were convincing as well as reasonable. However, the 
results can be improved by overcoming the limitations faced during this research work. These 
limitations and plans to overcome them are listed below: 
1. The Control Financial States (CFS) used in this research work were placed between the 
upper and lower financial bounds by judgments. However, the locations of these CFSs 
can be linked with several screening and performance criteria including, but not limited 
to, concessionaire’s experience, financial stability, market reputation, safety, lane 
availability, highway through put and passenger comfort. Hence if the concessionaire is 
expected to do poorly on these criteria, the CFS can be designed and used to reflect such 
a concessionaire in the model. This would enable the decision-makers to set up the model 
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specifically for a particular concessionaire and use it to design MAPs and concession 
term. 
2. The model developed above can be improved by introducing a penalty function. Using 
the penalty function the model can be forced for selection of a single MAP throughout 
the concession. However, the contractual penalty amounts that may be associated with 
making contractual changes are not available. These costs are generally categorized as 
transactional costs and consist of several contractual fees.  
3. The model developed and used in this research work has a stochastic dynamic 
programming model’s framework. Hence, increasing the stages and states will 
significantly increase the computational time. Hence, several values were rounded off to 
reduce the computational time for each analysis. Increasing the number of options, stages 
and states are expected to improve the overall results.   
4. Use of Discrete Values: This model only considers discrete values for Financial States 
and for few other parameters, which means that the optimal results obtained might be a 
reasonably good approximation of optimal solutions.    
5. Use of Financial Parameters Only: The mathematical model used here is basically a 
financial model. Hence, this model can be used only for parameters that can be linked to 
financial impact to the project. However, due to any reason, if non-financial parameters 
must be included in the analysis, then the model must be modified to use qualitative 
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states instead of Financial States. The use of qualitative states would require a very 
precise description of each state.  
6. Although this research work focuses only on a few aspects of PPPs with Availability 
Payments, this research work can be expanded further for satisfying both public sector 
and the private sector objectives. The model developed and discussed in this research 
work focuses only on two objectives. However, additional objectives can be conveniently 





Debt and Equity Financing (reproduced here from Sharma et al 2010) 
PPP projects are financed on the basis of expected revenues from project operations. If a 
project is expected to yield large revenues, sufficient debt financing from the financial 
market can be obtained. When the expected revenues fall short, debt financing may not 
cover total project costs and thus may create a financial gap. The financial gap needs to 
be closed with funds from either the public or the private sector. Equity holders take the 
entire downside risk and get repaid after debt service. This leads to the three issues. First, 
private partners are willing to invest in PPP projects only when they anticipate a high rate 
of return or minimum IRR from the investments. If the project is not sufficiently 
profitable, private partners will not spend a penny or take the risk. Therefore, public 
agencies may have to give away a significant share from the total profit to attract private 
investments, even if equity investments may be just a small percentage of the financial 
gap. Second, public agencies must protect their interests and ensure that private partners 
do not abandon projects when those partners obtain sufficient profits from PPP projects 
earlier than expected. An earlier exit from PPP projects may benefit private partners 
because they could reduce their operation, maintenance, or rehabilitation costs. Private 
partners are thus required to guarantee a minimum amount of investment to reduce the 
public agencies’ risk. Third, strong public resistance to high private profit in PPP projects 




Multi-objective Deterministic Dynamic Programming (MODDP) Model 
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Multi-objective Stochastic Dynamic Programming Model Using Simulation 
(MOklDP) 
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2009 -50  2021 18.15  2029 18.79  2037 19.57 
2013 17.73  2021 18.28  2029 18.94  2037 19.73 
2014 17.75  2022 18.22  2030 18.88  2038 19.67 
2014 17.78  2022 18.36  2030 19.03  2038 19.84 
2015 17.80  2023 18.3  2031 18.97  2039 19.78 
2015 17.83  2023 18.44  2031 19.13  2039 19.95 
2016 17.85  2024 18.43  2032 19.12  2040 19.95 
2016 17.88  2024 18.47  2032 19.17  2040 20 
2017 17.90  2025 18.46  2033 19.16  2041 20.01 
2017 17.93  2025 18.6  2033 19.32  2041 20.17 
2018 17.95  2026 18.54  2034 19.26  2042 20.12 
2018 17.98  2026 18.68  2034 19.42  2042 20.29 
2019 18  2027 18.62  2035 19.36  2043 20.24 
2019 18.13  2027 18.77  2035 19.52    
2020 18.12  2028 18.76  2036 19.52    
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Unavailability Factors for Presidio Parkway Project  
 
(Note: The figure above was taken from an online document. Since the original figure did not have high 
resolution the image might get blurred when taking print out. Please refer the following link to directly 






Equity Cash Flow For Presidio Parkway Project With 30 Year Concession Period 
  
Concessionaire's Perspective 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
Expenses                   
Equity 50.00                 
Taxes         2.32 4.64 4.64 4.64 4.64 
Operation  Costs         0.42 0.83 0.83 0.83 0.83 
Maintenance and Rehab Costs         1.03 2.06 0.00 2.06 0.00 
Debt Repayment                   
Senior Debt Repayment         13.04 13.04 13.04     
TIFIA Repayment               22.64 22.64 
Earnings                   
Profit from Construction (3% of construction cost )         15.03         
Availability Payment (Design and Financing Part)         15.00 30.00 30.00 30.00 30.00 
Availability Payment (O&M Part)         2.73 5.53 5.63 5.73 5.83 




Concessionaire's Perspective 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 2027 
Expenses                     
Equity                     
Taxes 4.64 4.64 4.64 4.64 4.64 4.64 4.64 4.64 4.64 4.64 
Operation  Costs 0.83 0.83 0.83 0.83 0.83 0.83 0.83 0.83 0.83 0.83 
Maintenance and Rehab Costs 2.06 0.03 2.06 0.69 2.06 0.69 2.06 0.69 2.06 0.69 
Debt Repayment                     
Senior Debt Repayment                     
TIFIA Repayment 22.64 22.64 22.64 22.64 22.64 22.64 22.64 22.64 22.64 22.64 
Earnings                     
Profit from Construction                      
Availability Payment (Design & Financing) 30.00 30.00 30.00 30.00 30.00 30.00 30.00 30.00 30.00 30.00 
Availability Payment (O&M) 5.93 6.13 6.28 6.43 6.58 6.74 6.90 7.06 7.22 7.39 




Concessionaire's Perspective 2028 2029 2030 2031 2032 2033 2034 2035 2036 2037 
Expenses                     
Equity                     
Taxes 4.64 4.64 4.64 4.64 4.64 4.64 4.64 4.64 4.64 4.64 
Operation  Costs 0.83 0.83 0.83 0.83 0.83 0.83 0.83 0.83 0.83 0.83 
Maintenance and Rehab Costs 2.06 0.69 2.06 0.69 2.06 0.69 2.06 0.69 2.06 0.69 
Debt Repayment                     
Senior Debt Repayment                     
TIFIA Repayment 22.64 22.64 22.64 22.64 22.64 22.64 22.64 22.64 22.64 22.64 
Earnings                     
Profit from Construction                      
Availability Payment (Design & Financing) 30.00 30.00 30.00 30.00 30.00 30.00 30.00 30.00 30.00 30.00 
Availability Payment (O&M) 7.56 7.73 7.91 8.10 8.29 8.48 8.68 8.88 9.09 9.30 




Concessionaire's Perspective 2038 2039 2040 2041 2042 2043 
Expenses             
Equity             
Taxes 4.64 4.64 4.64 4.64 4.64 2.32 
Operation  Costs 0.83 0.83 0.83 0.83 0.83 0.42 
Maintenance and Rehab Costs 2.06 0.69 2.06 0.69 2.06 1.03 
Debt Repayment             
Senior Debt Repayment             
TIFIA Repayment 22.64 22.64 22.64 22.64 22.64   
Earnings             
Profit from Construction              
Availability Payment (Design & Financing) 30.00 30.00 30.00 30.00 30.00 15.00 
Availability Payment (O&M) 9.51 9.73 9.95 10.18 10.41 5.24 








Stage 6 Computations 
During stage 6 of the project, the financial condition can be between $139M to $182M 
(Table 4). Hence, we observe that the final stage can take 44 states (182-139 + 1= 44). 
Thus, with 5 values of decision variables, we will have 44*5 = 220 rows in the Excel 
sheet during the 6th stage.  
During the final stage, the project will be in a state between $139M and $182M. The 
private sector will be eligible for availability payment and will also have the deductions. 
Apart from this, the Remaining Life Cycle costs will also be incurred after the stage 6. 
This leads to the following calculations: 
f6(182) =    w1 * [ 33.93*5 – E[D] + RSL] 
+ w2 * [{146 - (182 + 33.93*5 + FA - E[D])}2] ½ 
In the above formulation, “182+33.73*5+FA” gives us the new financial state without 
deductions. When deductions are applied to this form, we obtain a new financial state 
with deductions.  Similarly, when the MAP of 34.73 is analyzed, we get 
“182+34.73*5+FA.” In these formulations, we can observe the MAP as the part of the 
equation. However, the term FA, which stands for Financial Adjustment, will have to be 
180 
 
calculated by subtracting MAPs for 5-years from equity cash flows without deductions. 
In doing so, it was felt that the calculations will become confusing. Hence, these 
calculations were done using the available data.  
It was observed that under the conditions of no deduction, the private sector’s financial 
state during final stage will be $182.04M. Similarly, the private sector’s financial state 
during the second last stage will be $134.7M (Table 4). This jump in financial state 
occurs since the private sector receives money as per the equity cash flows without any 
deductions. The financial jump observed here corresponds to MAP of $35.53M. On the 
other hand, if the MAP of $33.93M is used in the equity cash flows, everything other 
than the MAPs will remain the same. Hence, in such condition, the private sector’s 
Financial State will be less by the difference between the MAPs. This can be shown 
below: 
MAP $35.53M  5*(35.53–35.53) = 0 
MAP $35.08M  5*(35.53-35.13) = 2.00 
MAP $34.63M,  5*(35.53-34.73) = 4.00 
MAP $34.18M  5*(35.53-34.33) = 6.00 
MAP $33.73M 5*(35.53-33.93) = 8.00 
Furthermore, the private sector will reach a financial state of $240.8M (Table 4) if there 
is no deduction. This requires a Financial Jump of 240.8 – 182.04 = $58.76 M across the 
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last stage. Thus, if we want to jump stages as well as consider different MAPs together, 
we must consider financial jumps for stages as well as financial jumps for different 
MAPs. Thus, we can calculate financial jumps for different MAPs as shown below: 
MAP $35.53M  CFS = 182.04 – 5*(35.53-35.53) + 58.76 = 182.04 + 58.76 
MAP $35.13M  CFS = 182.04 – 5*(35.53-35.13) + 58.76 = 182.04 + 60.76 
MAP $34.73M,  CFS = 182.04 – 5*(35.53-34.73) + 58.76 = 182.04 + 62.76 
MAP $34.33M  CFS = 182.04 – 5*(35.53-34.33) + 58.76= 182.04 + 64.76 
MAP $33.93M CFS = 182.04 – 5*(35.53-33.93) + 58.76 = 182.04 + 66.76 
Where, CFS is the Control Financial State  
Thus, instead of using previously defined formulation, the above formulation will be used 
and can be expressed as shown below: 
Minimize     w1· (MAP – Di  + RSLt)  +   
                     w2· |Control Financial State i – (Financial State Realized i-1 + FJ - Di| 
 where FJ is the financial jump across states and stages and can be expressed as 
FJ = MAP + FA 
Furthermore, assuming that the weights w1 equals 0.9 and w2 equals 0.1 as well as using 
the previously calculated values of expected deductions (as calculated in Section 4.2.1.2) 
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and RSL costs (as discussed in Section 4.2.2.2) to be $4.16 (calculated as $0.832M*5) 
and $591M, we obtain the values of f6 as shown below: 
(Note that following calculations use MAPs for 5-years. So, 169.65 represents 5 times the 
MAP of 33.93, 171.65 represents 5*34.33, 173.65 represents 5*34.73, 175.65 represents 
5*35.13 and 177.65 represents 5*35.53. Also note that the absolute value was obtained 
by taking square and then taking square root of the same term)   
f6(139) = 0.9*[169.65–4.16+591]+0.1*[{197-(139+50.76-4.16)}
2]½= 681.97   X  
f6(139) = 0.9*[171.65–4.16+591]+0.1*[{197-(139+52.76-4.16)}
2]½= 683.57   X 
f6(139) = 0.9*[173.65–4.16+591]+0.1*[{197-(139+54.76-4.16)}







2]½= 681.87   X   
f6(140) = 0.9*[171.65–4.16+591]+0.1*[{197-(140+52.76-4.16)}
2]½= 683.47   * 
f6(140) = 0.9*[173.65–4.16+591]+0.1*[{197-(140+54.76-4.16)}










2]½= 683.99   *   
f6(182) = 0.9*[171.65–4.16+591]+0.1*[{197-(182+52.76-4.16)}
2]½= 685.99    
f6(182) = 0.9*[173.65–4.16+591]+0.1*[{197-(182+54.76-4.16)}





In the above calculations, starred values represent the optimal values. It can be seen that 
if the states of $139M and $140M are realized before stage 6, the best strategy is to select 
the best alternative of the MAP of $33.93M (since first row has minimum value of 
681.97). However, it is observed that when the private sector is at those low financial 
levels and deductions are applied, the private sector will end up in a state that will not 
satisfy their IRR. Hence, this option must not be selected. Similar is the case with the 
immediately next alternative of the MAP of $34.33M. Hence, we select the third 
alternative of the MAP of $34.73M. On the other hand, when the state of $182M is 
achieved, the best strategy is again to have a MAP of $33.93M. The above results for the 
state of  $182M are intuitive since the above calculations are suggesting that when the 
private sector is at the ideal state, the smallest MAP should be selected (i.e., $33.93M in 
this case study).   
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Once these values are obtained, the calculations can focus on the previous (in this case, it 
is stage 5). 
Stage 5 Computations 
The stage 5 computations are very much similar to the stage 6 computations; however, 
there are a few changes. The recursion formula will be used to link the stage 5 and stage 
6 appropriately and obtain an optimal solution. Also, we will see that the RSL costs will 
no longer be included in the calculations. 
During stage 5 of the project, the financial condition can be between $100 and $135M (as 
seen from Table 4). Hence, we observe that the final stage can take 36 states (135-
100+1). Thus, with 5 values of decision variables, we will have 36*5 = 180 rows in the 
Excel sheet during the 5th stage.  
During this stage, the project will be in a state between $100M and $135M. The private 
sector will be eligible for availability payment and will also have the deductions. This 
leads to the following calculations: 
f5(100) =    w1 * [ 33.93*5 – Exp[D(ξ)]] 
+ w2 * |146 - (100 + FJ - Exp[D(ξ)])|  
Using the values of w1, w2 and expected deductions as in stage 6 we get: 
f5(100) = 0.9*[169.65–4.16]+0.1*[{146-(100+39.3-4.16)}




2]½= 151.62  
f5(100) = 0.9*[173.65–4.16]+0.1*[{146-(100+43.3-4.16)}







2]½= 149.92 * 
f5(101) = 0.9*[171.65–4.16]+0.1*[{146-(101+41.3-4.16)}
2]½= 151.52  
f5(101) = 0.9*[173.65–4.16]+0.1*[{146-(101+43.3-4.16)}








2]½= 151.35 * 
f5(135) = 0.9*[171.65–4.16]+0.1*[{146-(135+41.3-4.16)}
2]½= 153.35  
f5(135) = 0.9*[173.65–4.16]+0.1*[{146-(135+43.3-4.16)}







In the above calculations starred values represent the optimal values only for the 5th stage 
but these are not the optimal values for all the remaining stages. Also note that the 
expected value for deduction used in this stage is same as in stage 6, since it is assumed 
here that the distribution of deductions may not change. Furthermore, the remaining life 
cycle costs are not used in above calculations.   
The above computations provide the values of objective function for stage 5 only. These 
do not have values of stage f6. Hence, we must use the recursion function to obtain the 
optimal values. The use of the recursion function will ensure that the strategy used during 
stage 5 will be best for stages 5 and 6. 
In order to use the recursion function, we must estimate the new state that will be realized 
after stage 5. Hence, let us assume that the state realized before stage 5 was $130M. We 
further assume that the deduction realized was $0.832M. This leads us to the new state 
for all the MAP values as below: 
f’5 to 6 (New) = f5(Current) +FJ - Exp[D(ξ)] 
 
f5(87) = 130+ 39.3 – 0.94 *5 = 165.13 ~ 165 
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f5(87) = 130+ 41.3 – 0.94 *5 = 167.13 ~ 167 
f5(87) = 130+ 43.3 – 0.94 *5 = 169.13 ~ 169 
f5(87) = 130+ 45.3 – 0.94 *5= 171.13 ~ 171 
f5(87) = 130+ 47.3 – 0.94 *5= 173.13 ~ 173 
The recursion formula must be used now for the states established above. The recursion 
formula can be expressed as: 
f` Recursion (t, t+1) = Minimize (Realized Combined Objective Function) t  
                                          + (Expected Combined Objective Function) t+1 
For all these states, we refer the stage 6 computations.  
For f6 (165) we observe that  
State MAP Combined Objective Function Optimal Decision 
165.0 33.93 682.2995954*  
MAP = 33.93 
 
Objective Function = 682.29 
165.0 34.33 684.2995954 
165.0 34.73 686.2995954 
165.0 35.13 688.2995954 
165.0 35.53 690.2995954 
For f6 (167) we observe that  
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State MAP Combined Objective Function Optimal Decision 
167.0 33.93 682.4995954*  
MAP = 33.93 
 
Objective Function = 682.49 
167.0 34.33 684.4995954 
167.0 34.73 686.4995954 
167.0 35.13 688.4995954 
167.0 35.53 690.4995954 
For f6 (169) we observe that 
State MAP Combined Objective Function Optimal Decision 
169.0 33.93 682.6995954*  
MAP = 33.73 
 
Objective Function = 682.69 
169.0 34.33 684.6995954 
169.0 34.73 686.6995954 
169.0 35.13 688.6995954 
169.0 35.53 690.6995954 
For f6 (171) we observe that 
State MAP Combined Objective Function Optimal Decision 
171.0 33.93 682.8996*  
MAP = 33.73 
 
Objective Function = 682.89 
171.0 34.33 684.8996 
171.0 34.73 686.8996 
171.0 35.13 688.8996 
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171.0 35.53 690.8996 
For f6 (173) we observe that 
State MAP Combined Objective Function Optimal Decision 
173.0 33.93 683.0996*  
MAP = 33.73 
 
Objective Function = 683.09 
173.0 34.33 685.0996 
173.0 34.73 687.0996 
173.0 35.13 689.0996 
173.0 35.53 691.0996 
Adding these optimal values of f6 with optimal values of f5 we get the following 
calculations: 
f5(130) = 0.9*[169.65–4.16]+0.1*[{146-(130+39.3-4.16)}
2]½= 150.85  
f5(130) = 0.9*[171.65–4.16]+0.1*[{146-(130+41.3-4.16)}
2]½= 152.85  
f5(130) = 0.9*[173.65–4.16]+0.1*[{146-(130+43.3-4.16)}






f5(130.0) = 150.85+ 682.29 = 833.15*          Relates to State of f6(165)  
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f5(130.0) = 152.85+ 682.49 = 835.35          Relates to State of f6(167)  
f5(130.0) = 154.85+ 682.69  = 837.55                 Relates to State of f6(169) 
f5(130.0) = 156.85+ 682.89  = 839.75                  Relates to State of f6(171)  
f5(130.0) = 158.85+ 683.09  = 841.95                 Relates to State of f6(173)  
In the above calculations, the value of 833.15 is the optimal value for stages 5 and 6 
considered together. Hence, if a state of 130 is realized before stage 5, the MAP (decision 
variable) of 33.93 must be chosen.  
These calculations must be carried out for all the remaining states until the calculations 
reach the beginning stage. The computation procedure used for stage 5 must also be used 
for stages 4, 3, 2, and 1. Once the calculations for all the stages are obtained, the forward 
calculations can begin. Following paragraphs shows the computations for stage 1. 
 Stage 1 Computations 
During Stage 1 the private sector’s financial condition can take any value 
between -$35.72M and -$34.05M (i.e., between -$36M and -$34M as seen from Table 
4).Hence, we observe that the final stage can take 3 states (-34-(-36)+1). Thus, with 5 
values of decision variables, we will have 3*5 = 15 rows in the Excel sheet during the 1st 
stage. During this stage, the project will be in a state between $100M and $135M. The 
private sector will be eligible for availability payment and will also have the deductions. 
This leads to the following calculations: 
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f1(-34) =    w1 * [ 33.93*5 – Exp[D(ξ)] ] 
+ w2 * |[{-36.0 - (-34.0 + FJ - Exp[D(ξ)])| 
Assuming that w1=0.9 and w2 = 0.1 we perform the following calculations: 
f1(-36) = 0.9*[169.65–4.16]+0.1*[{-36-(-36+43.08-4.16)}
2]½= 149.54*  
f1(-36) = 0.9*[171.65–4.16]+0.1*[{-36-(-36+45.08-4.16)}
2]½= 151.14  
f1(-36) = 0.9*[173.65–4.16]+0.1*[{-36-(-36+47.08-4.16)}







2]½= 149.44 *  
f1(-35) = 0.9*[171.65–4.16]+0.1*[{-36-(-35+45.08-4.16)}
2]½= 151.04  
f1(-35) = 0.9*[173.65–4.16]+0.1*[{-36-(-35+47.08-4.16)}









2]½= 149.34 * 
f1(-34) = 0.9*[171.65–4.16]+0.1*[{-36-(-34+45.08-4.16)}
2]½= 150.94  
f1(-34) = 0.9*[173.65–4.16]+0.1*[{-36-(-34+47.08-4.16)}





In the above calculations starred values represent the optimal values for 1st stage only. 
Also note that the expected value for deduction used in this stage is same as in stage all 
the previous stages, since it is assumed here that the distribution of deductions may not 
change.   
The above computations provide the values of objective function for stage 1 only. These 
do not have values of stage f2 and beyond. Hence, we must use the recursion function to 
obtain the optimal values. The use of the recursion function will ensure that the strategy 
used during stage 1 will be best for stages 1 and all the succeeding stages. 
In order to use the recursion function, we must estimate the new state that will be realized 
after stage 1. Hence, let us assume that the state realized before stage 5 was $-34M. We 
further assume that the deduction realized was $0.832M. This leads us to the new state 
for all the MAPs as below 
f1(-34) = -34+ 43.08 – 0.94 *5 = 4.91 ~ 5 
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f1(-34) = -34+ 45.08 – 0.94 *5 = 6.91 ~ 7 
f1(-34) = -34+ 47.08 – 0.94 *5= 8.91 ~ 9 
f1(-34) = -34+ 49.08 – 0.94 *5= 10.91 ~ 11  
f1(-34) = -34+ 51.08 – 0.94 *5= 12.91 ~ 13 
The recursion formula must be used now for the states established above. The recursion 
formula can be expressed as: 
f` Recursion (t, t+1) = Minimize (Realized Combined Objective Function) t  
                                          + (Expected Combined Objective Function) t+1 
Hence, we look up for these states in the calculations for Stage 2. For Stage 2, we observe 
the following: 
For f2 (5) we observe that: 
State MAP Combined Objective Function Optimal Decision 
5 33.93 
Does Not Exist Since the State 
of 5 represents a condition that 
the private sector will quit 
 
MAP = Nil 
 







For f2 (7) we observe that: 
State MAP Combined Objective Function Optimal Decision 
7 33.93 Infeasible  
MAP = 34.73 
 
Objective Function = 
1294.17  
7 34.33 Infeasible 
7 34.73 1294.401382 
7 35.13 1294.201382 
7 35.53 1294.175101* 
For f2 (9) we observe that:  
State MAP Combined Objective Function Optimal Decision 
9 33.93 Infeasible  
MAP = 35.13 
 
Objective Function = 1292.37  
9 34.33 1292.601382 
9 34.73 1292.401382 
9 35.13 1292.375101* 
9 35.53 1292.575101 
For f2 (11) we observe that:  
State MAP Combined Objective Function Optimal Decision 
11 33.93 1290.801382  
MAP = 34.73 
 
11 34.33 1290.601382 
11 34.73 1290.575101* 
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11 35.13 1290.775101 Objective Function = 1290.57 
11 35.53 1290.975101 
For f2 (13) we observe that  
State MAP Combined Objective Function Optimal Decision 
13 33.93 1288.801382  
MAP = 34.33 
 
Objective Function = 1288.77 
13 34.33 1288.775101* 
13 34.73 1288.975101 
13 35.13 1289.175101 
13 35.53 1289.53682 
We combine the optimal values of Stage 1 with the optimal values for all the stages 
beyond Stage 1 (in this case it is stage 2 to stage 6) we get the following 
 
f1(-34) = 149.34 + Infeasible = Infeasible  Relates to State of f2(5)  
f1(-34) = 150.94 + 1294.17 =  1445.12  Relates to State of f2(7) 
f1(-34) = 152.54 + 1292.37 = 1444.92*  Relates to State of f2(9) 
f1(-34) = 154.53 + 1290.57 =  1445.10  Relates to State of f2(11) 
f1(-34) = 156.53 + 1288.77 =  1445.30  Relates to State of f2(13) 
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In the above calculations, the value of 1444.92 is the minimum value for the combined 
objective function considering all the stages from Stage 1 to Stage 6. Hence if a state of  
(–34) is realized after the construction phase MAP of 34.73 must be chosen as the 
optimal answer.  
This concludes the backward-pass Calculations for the model. Once the backward 
calculations are done the model will be left with tables containing all the calculations. 
When realization pass calculation begins the model will select the path yielding the 
minimum combined objective function. The model is developed in such a way that it 
documents the backward and realization pass calculations for the path selected. Note that 
for the backward calculations we used expected values, but for the forward calculations, 
we will use randomly generated deductions. These randomly generated values will follow 
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 Dt = Expected Deduction For the Concession Period t 
 T = Concession Period 
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Value of Stochastic Solutions 
USING DIFFERENT CONTROL BOUNDS 
Control Bounds No Recourse MObDP Values VSS With No Recourse 
Upper BND 1449.344 1459.54 10.196 
U and 25% 1448.744 1456.5 7.756 
25% to 50% 1447.444 1453.09 5.646 
50% to 75% 1446.244 1449.4 3.156 
75% and L (Base Case) 1444.944 1446.3 1.356 
CB as LB 1444.144 1445.51 1.366 
PRIVATE SECTOR'S RISK APTITUDE 
  No Recourse MObDP Values VSS With No Recourse 
8% Return 1381.044 1381.16 0.116 
9% Return 1397.984 1399.63 1.646 
10% Return 1416.684 1417.96 1.276 
8% Return 1436.124 1436.68 0.556 
9% Return 1451.314 1456.8 5.486 
10% Return 1478.824 1478.85 0.026 
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PRIVATE SECTOR LOSS DURING CONSTRUCTION 
  No Recourse MObDP Values VSS 
Loss of 0% (BaseCase) 1444.944 1446.3 1.356 
Loss of 0.5% 1448.584 1450.23 1.646 
Loss of 1.0% 1451.284 1452.95 1.666 
Loss of 1.5% 1453.044 1455.18 2.136 
Loss of 2.0% 1455.744 1458.71 2.966 
Loss of 2.5% 1457.624 1461.1 3.476 
Loss of 3.0% 1460.324 1464.68 4.356 
PRIVATE SECTORS LEARNING 
  No Recourse MObDP Values VSS With No Recourse 
80% (i..e. 20% Learning ) 1444.944 1446.85 1.906 
85% (i.e., 15% Learning) 1444.944 1446.64 1.696 
90% (i.e., 10% Learning) 1444.944 1446.54 1.596 
95% (i.e., 05% Learning) 1444.944 1446.44 1.496 





Sample Calculations For the Realization Pass (Continued from Appendix 9) 
The first stage for forward calculations begins with Stage 1. Stage 1 can take any value 
between -$35.72M and -$34.05M (i.e., between -$36M and -$34M). Hence, we assume 
and select -$34M as the initial financial state of the private sector. Now, we should locate 
the value of -$34M in the Stage 1 table, which is readily available to us from the 
backward-pass. After locating the values for the state -$34M, we can easily obtain an 
optimal solution for Stage 1 and all the stages after that as shown below. 
During Stage 1, the private sector performs and becomes eligible for MAP. However, 
deductions are applied to MAP for unavailability of asset. These deductions are randomly 
generated using Monte Carlo simulation. Uniform distribution is used in the calculations 
(as described in Section 4.2.1.2) having a lower bound value of $0 and upper bound value 
of $1.66M. The value of $1.664M is obtained by assuming that the private sector will 
leave the PPP contract midway if the deduction increases beyond $1.664M (since the 
private sector will have an IRR of less than 11.5%). Hence, we generate random values 
using RAND() function in MS Excel and using formula RAND()*(b-a) + a (where a is 
the lower bound value and b is the upper bound value for the distribution). 
Let us assume that MS Excel generates a value of $1.3M as deduction for Stage 1. Thus, 
we replace the expected value of deduction by the realized value of deduction. This will 
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require us to update our model with the realized value and then reevaluate the strategy for 
remaining stages.  
During Stage 1   
Realizing that the deduction is $1.3M, the following calculations are carried out to 
calculate the objective function for the state of. f1(-34):  
f1(-34) = 0.9*[169.65–1.3*5]+0.1*[{-36-(-34+43.08-1.3*5)}
2]½= 147.47*  
f1(-34) = 0.9*[171.65–1.3*5]+0.1*[{-36-(-34+45.08-1.3*5)}
2]½= 149.07  
f1(-34) = 0.9*[173.65–1.3*5]+0.1*[{-36-(-34+47.08-1.3*5)}





Due to the realized deductions, the following state will be achieved after Stage 1. Hence, 
we now call these as Stage 2 values. 
f1(-34) + FJ+ Realized Changes = -34+43.08-5*1.3 = 2.58 ~ 3 = f2(New) 
f1(-34) + FJ+ Realized Changes = -34+45.08-5*1.3 = 4.58 ~ 5 = f2(New) 
f1(-34) + FJ+ Realized Changes = -34+47.08-5*1.3 = 6.58 ~ 7 = f2(New) 
f1(-34) + FJ+ Realized Changes = -34+49.08-5*1.3 = 8.58 ~ 9 = f2(New) 
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f1(-34) + FJ+ Realized Changes = -34+51.08-5*1.3 = 10.58 ~ 11 = f2(New) 
Hence, we look up for these states in the calculations for Stage 2. For Stage 2, we observe 
the following: 
For f2 (3) we observe that:  
State MAP Combined Objective Function Optimal Decision 
3 33.93 
Does Not Exist Since the State 
of 3 represents a condition that 
the private sector will quit 
 
MAP = Nil 
 





For f2 (5) we observe that:  
State MAP Combined Objective Function Optimal Decision 
5 33.93 
Does Not Exist Since the State 
of 5 represents a condition that 
the private sector will quit 
 
MAP = Nil 
 





For f2 (7) we observe that:  
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State MAP Combined Objective Function Optimal Decision 
7 33.93 Infeasible  
MAP = 35.53 
 
Objective Function = 1294.17 
7 34.33 Infeasible 
7 34.73 1294.401382 
7 35.13 1294.201382 
7 35.53 1294.175101* 
For f2 (9) we observe that:  
State MAP Combined Objective Function Optimal Decision 
9 33.93 Infeasible  
MAP = 35.13 
 
Objective Function = 1292.37 
9 34.33 1292.601382 
9 34.73 1292.401382 
9 35.13 1292.375101* 
9 35.53 1292.575101 
For f2 (11) we observe that:  
State MAP Combined Objective Function Optimal Decision 
11 33.93 1290.801382  
MAP = 34.73 
 
Objective Function = 1290.57 
11 34.33 1290.601382 
11 34.73 1290.575101* 
11 35.13 1290.775101 
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11 35.53 1290.975101 
We combine the optimal values of stage 1 with the optimal values for all the stages 
beyond stage 1 (in this case it is stage 2 to stage 6) we get the following: 
f1(-34) = 147.47 + Infeasible = Infeasible        Relates to State of f2(3)  
f1(-34) = 149.07 + Infeasible = Infeasible        Relates to State of f2(5)  
f1(-34) = 150.67 + 1294.17 = 1444.85          Relates to State of f2(7)  
f1(-34) = 152.27 + 1292.37 = 1444.65*         Relates to State of f2(9)  
f1(-34) = 154.19 + 1290.57 = 1444.76         Relates to State of f2(11) 
As per the above calculation, we can conclude that as we start from Stage 1 with a state 
of -$34M, the private sector faced an annual deduction of $1.3M. Hence, after running 
the realization pass calculations between Stage 1 and Stage 2, we realize that before the 
start of Stage 2, adopting a MAP of 35.13 will be the best alternative since the objective 
function will take a value of $1444.65M and would be the minimum value when 
combined with $152.27M for stage 1.  
Repeating the procedures to input simulated deduction in the model (as demonstrated in 
the section “During Stage 1”) and then calculating the new state as well as corresponding 
optimal values (as demonstrated in “After Stage 1, i.e., Stage2”), for all the remaining 




Determining Number of Iterations 
Simulations must be repeated several times to build confidence in the answers. But, a 
question arises: How many times must the model be run to have a desirable confidence 
level in the answers?  
Weiss (2004) shows that a sample size can be calculated using the following formula:  
n = tu.vwxy/{	| }9 
where, 
 n = Sample size 
Zα/2 = Z score having an area of α/2 to its right under the standard normal curve 
 E = Margin of error 
In our case   
  α/2 = teu.~v9 } = 0.25 
  Zα/2 = 1.96   (Obtained from standard normal tables) 
  E = 10% 
207 
 
Substituting these values in the equation for n, we get:  
n = tu.vw.~	u. }9= 96.04 ~ 97 samples 
Hence, if we run the model 97 times, the margin of error in our estimate of optimal MAP 
will be 0.1 or less; that is, at the most, plus or minus 10%. However the model was run 
for 1000 iterations for several sensitivity analyses since it was felt that running more 
iterations as necessary to have conclusive results. 
Following table provides the number of samples that for various margins of errors. 
Table 20 Number of Samples Depending on Margin of Error (Significance of 5%)  












Counting the Number of Calculations  
Calculating number of calculations was important here since several scenarios 
calculations were done using simulations.  
The base case model has $241M, $182M, $135M, $91M, $53M, $17M and $-34M as 
financial states on the upper bound. Similarly values of $189M, $139M, $100M, $64M, 
$35M, $7M and -36$M were observed on the lower bound. These bounds, thus gave rise 
to 52 (obtained by 241-189), 43, 35, 27, 18 and 10 states, respectively. Since from each 
state we have 5 MAPs we must perform 260 (obtained by 52*5), 215, 175,135 and 90 
calculations, respectively. Adding all these calculations required us to perform 875 
calculations to conduct one analysis. If we increase the accuracy up to $0.1M then we 
would be required to calculate 8750 calculations. 
Thus for each simulation if we carry out just 100 iterations the calculations would 
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FHWA – Federal Highway Administration 
SEP-14 – Special Experimental Project 14 
ISTEA – Intermodal  Surface Transportation Efficiency Act  
USDOT – United States Department of Transportation 
CBO – Congressional Budget Office 
GAO - Government Accountability Office 
NCHRP – National Cooperative Highway Research Program 
WACC – Weighted Average Cost of Capital 
BVSS – Best Value Source Selection 
BVCS – Best Value Contributing Factors 
MTG – Minimum Traffic Guarantee 
MAP – Maximum Availability Payment 
ORNL – Oak Ridge National Laboratory 
IRR – Internal Rate of Return 
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MARR – Minimum Acceptable Rate of Return 
DB – Design Build 
DBFOM – Design Build Finance Operate and Maintain 
DBOM – Design Build Operate and Maintain 
BOT – Build Operate and Transfer 
PPIAF – Public-Private Infrastructure Advisory Facility 
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MOSDP – Multi-objective Stochastic Dynamic Programming  
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BVO – Best Value Objectives  
GLP – Golden Link Partners 
VfM – Value for Money 
IRR – Internal Rate of Return 
MARR – Minimum Acceptable Rate of Return 
PCM – Post Concession Maintenance 
LCC – Life Cycle Costs 
CFS t = Control Financial State at time t 
FSA t= Financial State Achieved at time t 
O&M – Operations  and Maintenance   
MARR – Minimum Acceptable Rate or Return 
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6. NCHRP Report 561 
7. The National Council for Public Private Partnership (NCPPP) 
Concession: A grant of a tract of land made by a government or other controlling 
authority in return for stipulated services or a promise that the land will be used for a 
specific purpose. OR “This type of PPP is known as a Concession: that is, a ‘user pays’ 
model in which a private-sector party (the Concessionaire) is allowed to charge the 
general public Service Fees for using the Facility—for example the payment of a toll for 
using a bridge, tunnel or road. The toll reimburses the Concessionaire for the cost of 
building and operating the Facility, which usually reverts to public-sector control at the 
end of the Concession period.” (Yescombe, 2007) 
Shadow Tolling: Shadow tolls are per vehicle amounts paid to a facility operator by a 
third party such as a sponsoring governmental entity. Shadow tolls are not paid by facility 
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users. Shadow toll amounts paid to a facility operator vary by contract and are typically 
based upon the type of vehicle and distance traveled. 
Equity Cash Flow: Cash flow available to equity holders. It is equal to net income plus 
depreciation less capital expenditures less increases in net working capital (NWC) less 
principal repayment plus new debt proceeds. 
Availability Payment Mechanism: For the purpose of this research an Availability 
Payments Mechanism is defined as – the mechanism by which the private sector is 
reimbursed by the public sector. It consists of payments (in $M) and duration (in years).    
Ramp Up Period: Time for traffic volumes to reach their full potential, without 
considering growth, after the opening of a new toll facility. The ramp-up period, which 
can last for several years, is the time it takes for users to become aware of the new toll 
road, change their travel patterns accordingly, and recognize the potential time-savings of 
using the new toll road  
Cash Flow: Cash flow is cash receipts minus cash disbursements from a given operation 
or asset for a given period. A cash flow statement shows all sources and uses of cash 
reflected in the balance sheet cash account from one period to the next. (OR) It’s the cash 
generated by a project. 
Equity: The portion of the project’s capex contributed by the investors to the Project 
Company, either as share capital or subordinated debt. 
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DSR or DSRA: Debt Service Reserve Account, a Reserve Account with a cash balance 
sufficient to cover the next scheduled debt service payment. 
Debt: The obligation to repay an agreed amount of money. 
Debt Capacity: The total amount of debt a company can prudently support given its 
earnings expectations, equity base, and asset liquidation value. 
Debt Service: Principal repayments plus interest payable; usually expressed as the 
annual amount due per calendar or financial year. 
Discount Rate: The annual percentage rate used to determine the present value of future 
cash flows. 
Financial Close: The date on which all project contracts and financing documentation 
are signed and conditions precedent to initial drawing of the debt have been satisfied or 
waived. 
Internal Rate of Return (IRR): The discount rate that makes the net present value equal 
to zero. Multiple IRRs occur mathematically if the periodic cash flows change signs more 
than once. 
Minimum Acceptable Rate of Return (MARR) : It is the is the minimum rate of return 
on a project a manager or company is willing to accept before starting a project, given its 
risk and the opportunity cost of forgoing other projects. 
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Best Value: A procurement process where price and other key factors are considered in 
the evaluation and selection process to minimize impacts and enhance the long-term 
performance and value of construction. 
Design-Build (DB): A DB is when the private partner provides both design and 
construction of a project to the public agency. This type of partnership can reduce time, 
save money, provide stronger guarantees and allocate additional project risk to the private 
sector. It also reduces conflict by having a single entity responsible to the public owner 
for the design and construction. The public sector partner owns the assets and has the 
responsibility for the operation and maintenance. 
Design-Build-Operate (DBO): A single contract is awarded for the design, construction, 
and operation of a capital improvement. Title to the facility remains with the public 
sector unless the project is a design/build/operate/ transfer or design/build/own/operate 
project. 
Design-Build-Operate-Maintain (DBOM): The design-build-operate-maintain 
(DBOM) model is an integrated partnership that combines the design and construction 
responsibilities of design-build procurements with operations and maintenance. These 
project components are procured from the private section in a single contract with 
financing secured by the public sector. The public agency maintains ownership and 




Design Build Finance Operate and Maintain (DBFOM): With the Design-Build-
Finance-Operate-Maintain (DBFOM) approach, the responsibilities for designing, 
building, financing, operating and maintaining are bundled together and transferred to 
private sector partners. 
TIFIA Program: The Transportation Infrastructure Finance and Innovation Act (TIFIA) 
program provides Federal credit assistance in the form of direct loans, loan guarantees, 
and standby lines of credit to finance surface transportation projects of national and 
regional significance. 
Value for Money (VFM): VfM takes the public cost comparator beyond just producing 
a market value for the project, but instead computes if there will be a return on 
investment, or value for money, to the end-users it does this by comparing the results 
with competitive bids from private firms. 
